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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 




P-uBLic S·ERVICE CoMMliSSION oF 





ST·ATm]M·EN·T OF THE ·,c~~s.E 
Statutory Review pursuant to Section 76-6-16, R. ·S. 
U. 19~33, ·of a Report and ·Order of defendant, Public 
Service :Commission of Utah, dated March 14, 1940 
(~R. 56) issuing Certificate of Convenien.ce and N·ecessity 
N·o. 534 to defendant, Airway Motor ·Coach Llines, Inc., 
authorizing the holder thereof to render s·ervi~ce as a 
comm.on motor carrier of pa.s.senger~s between S~alt ·Lake 
City, and Murray, Sandy, Crescent, Draper, Midvale, 
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West .Jor·d:an, Riverton, Taylorsville and Bennion, Utah, 
over -certain designated routes. 
On January 24, 1940 defendant, Airv;ay Motor ·Coach 
Lines, Inc., filed with the ~C-ommission its application for 
a Certificate ·ot .c:onvenience and N e·cessity to render rthe 
serviee authorized ull!der the above order, (R. 1). A heaT-
ing pursuant to statute was ordered and a. time set, (R. 
9) and notice giVlen (R. 10-11). The granting of the ap-
plication wa.s protested in writing ·by plaintiff, Utah 
Light and Traction 'Company (R. 16, et seq.) and in addi-
tion, at the hearing, by the Salt Lake & Utah Railroad 
Corporation (R. 23) and various other parties, (R. 24 
to 26). 
Issues ,of fact raised by the protests (R. 16 to 19) 
and framed by the statutes of the State of Utah in su0h 
cas·es made and provided (!Sections 5 and 6, ·Chap. 6·5, 
Laws of Utah 19·35) were : 
1. T·he fi~nancial ability of appli~cant to perform 
the proposed service. 
2. ~whether or not the highways to :he used 
pursuant to the applicati,on were already over-bur-
dened with traffic. 
3. Whether or not t;he public convenience and 
necessity require the p·roposed service, or any part 
thereof. 
4. The effect of the proposed serVIce upon 
existing serviee, ·and whether or not the pr,oposed 
service would be an unneiCessa.ry duplication of serv-
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iee between either other common motor carriers or 
eompeting steam a.nd electric railroads. 
On this last issue plaintiff alleged (R. 17) and 
defendant, Air\Yays -admitted (R. 44) that for many 
years pri,o-r to 19·33 plaintiff operated an electric street 
railway for common carrier passenger service hetwe~n 
Salt Lake ·City, Murray, Midvale and Sandy, for whic:h 
since that date 1has been substituted a motor gas bus 
service operating pursuant to Certificates of Convenien-ce 
and Necessity Nos. 305 and 409, issued by defendant, 
Public. ;Service Commission. Plaintiff alleged (R. 18) 
that a porti•on of the propos.ed service wa.s in '' dire·ct 
conflict'' \Yith the above servi·ce of the plaintiff, that the 
public in this particular territory was adequately served, 
that there was no reasonable nece:s:Sity for the proposed 
duplication of service which would jeopardize the ability 
of plaintiff to ·furnish its existing service, both in this 
territory and in other territories s·erved by plaintiff, and 
wo'uld result in an economic loss not of benefit to the 
pubiic as a whole. To this the defendant, Airways, 
replied, (R. 45) admitting that part of the prop•a:sed serv-
ice was in direct confli,ct 'vith that of applicant, but was 
justified because: 
(a) Plaintiff's servi·ce south of 33rd South was 
inadequate and irregular; 
(b) The public for this reason,favored the Airways' 
application; 
(.c) Plaintiff's fares were excessive and thus pro-
ihibited general public us-e of its service; 
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(d) Plaintiff's op·erati,ons south of 33rd South were 
unpr.ofitahle to date; 
(e) Applicant was offering additional serVI·Ce to 
other c:ommunities without servi·ce, contingent upon the 
granting of the entire application. 
Defendant, Airways, further admitted (R. 46) that 
the granting of its Applicati,on would jeopardize the 
ability of plaintiff to ,continue to render service south of 
3'3.rd South and to Murray, Midvale and Sandy, but 
claimed that the granting of the Application would permit 
plaintiff to abandon this allegedly unprofitahle opera-
tion, and .t1hus he of benefit to the balance of plaintiff's 
system. 
F·ollowing the hearing at whieh evidence both oral 
and written wa:s adduced (R. 27 to 42, Tr. 1 to 3·62), the 
Commission filed its Report (R. 151 to· :5:5) and the Order 
now under attack by the plaintiff. Pursuant to Section 
76-6-1'5, R .. S. U. 19·33, plaintiff ·filed its petition for rehear-
ing, (R. 59, et seq.) containing the matters required to 
be set forth by the rules of procedure of the c:o,mmission. 
This petition was denied without opinion, on May 15, 
1940, (R. 105 ), Commissioner Wiesley of the Public Serv-
ice c:ommission dissenting (R .. 105), and,on May 17 plain-
tiff applied for a review of the order by this Court. 
The Record ·certified by the C:ommission to the ·Court 
pursuant to the Writ of Review contains als'o' an affidavit 
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(R·. 103-4) filed May 7, 1940 whieh will hereinafter be 
referred to by plaintiff, together '\Yith a dissenting opinion 
by Commissioner ,,-.-iesley filed May lH, 19~40, (R. 107-
110). 
Apart from the merits of this review .certain proceed-
ings in this Court haYe been had with respect to plaintiff's 
applicati·on for a stay pursuant to 1S;ection 76-·6-17, R. S. 
u. 1933. 
II. 
STATE:MEN·T OF ALDE~GED ERRO·R,S. 
The alleged errors in the order of the Commission 
may be classified under .the following general headings, 
and in eomp.Iian·ce with statute were presented to the 
Commission in plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing, 
-(R. 59-62) : 
A. That the ·Commission failed to make find-
ings of fact on issues rna terial to the hearing. 
B. Tha.t the Commission made findings of fact 
n<>t supported by any substantial evidence, and in 
some cases in ·conflict with stipulated or uncontro-
verted evidence to the contrary. 
10. ·That the Cummission acted contrary to law 
and in violation of ~the Sta.tute;s of the .State of Utah, 
and in an arbitrary and capricious manner in ~certain 
particulars hereinafter set forth. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
III. 
P~ARTI~CUILAR Q·UES:TIONS INV·O·LVE·D. 
The particular questions involved for determinati,on 
under the foregoing category of errors are as follows: 
A. Should the Report and Order be vacated and set 
aside, and the proceeding remanded, because the Commis-
sion failed to make findings of fact on material issues as 
follows: 
(1} As to the extent of the existing servi'Ce of the 
plaintiff, Utah L~ight and Traction ·C:ompany, into the 
area. affe-cted by the application. 
(:2) As to the extent of existing service rendered 
by other co~mon m·otor carriers and ·electric railroads 
into the area. affected by the application. 
(-3} As. to Wlhether or not the existing service being 
rendered by plaintiff in the territory aff.e.cted is reason-
ably adequate to meet the needs of the publirc; and if 
not, in what respeets .such existing service is inadequate, 
and whether or not plaintiff has been and now is willing 
and ready to render adequate service. 
( 4) As to whether or not the existing service being 
rendered ihy pr,otestants other than .plaintiff into the 
territory affected is reasonably adequate to meet the 
needs of the public; and if not, in wthat respects such 
existing service is inadequate, and whether or not said 
protestants have been and now are rea.dy and willing to 
render adequate service. 
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(5} _._\s to w·hat service, if any, into territorie:S other 
than those now serYed by plaintiff and other protestants, 
is neeessary and convenient and in the public interest, 
and "yhether or not plaintiff or .other protesta.nts has 
been and no\v is ready and .. willing to render such service. 
(6) As to \Yhether ·Or not the proposed service would 
be an unne-cessary duplicati•on of serYice between that 
rendered by plaintiff and other protestants. 
B. Should the Report and Order be vacated and set 
aside, and the proceedings remanded to the :Commission, 
because the Commission made findings of fact not sup-
ported by any substantial evidence, as follows: 
(1) .-,.The rates now in effect are the lowest that 
this Commission has been able to procure. How·ever, 
voluntary reductions would a.t any time have been in 
order. When the Co-mmission has sought reductions the 
attitude of the Traction Company ihas been that the oper-
ation of this line, as also the op·eration of the Traction 
system a.s a whole yielded little or n•o return upon the 
investment, and if the ~f.urray..!Sandy line "\Vere granted 
further reductions, it would mean that the now meager 
net operations of the Traction Company would be further 
reduced and the users of the !S'ervi·ce in .Salt Lake City 
would be foreed t.o carry in part the eosts of the service 
beyond ·tJhe ·city limits." (Report p. 3, R .. 51). 
(2) ''* * * but in a case such as this where the 
proposed rates are in some instances as much aS: forty-
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s1x percent under the present rates 
p. 3, R.. 5·1) . 
* * * (Report 
(3)i ":1ft ~ * there :is at the pre-sent time no 
reason to suppose that such patrons will n,o,t continue to 
enjoy the benefits of these rates.'' (Report .p. 4, R. 512.). 
(4) "·The: granting of this application will not sub-
stantiafly detra:et from nor impair existing common 
carrier service * * *.'' (Repo~rt. p. 7, R. 55). 
C. Should the Report and Order be vacated and set 
aside, and the case ·remanded, because of arbitrary and 
capricious action contrary to law and in violation of 
statute in the following respects: 
( 1) 'The C·ommission has issued a ·C·erti:ficate of 
C;onvenience and Necessity although applicant has not 
obtained franchises or licenses from the local C'ounty 
and .City authorities concerned, as required by law. 
(·2) 'The C~o~mmission has issued a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity despite evidence on which it 
itself ha.s found that applieant has not the financial ability 
to properly perform the servi·ce proposed. 
('3) The ·C'ommission has issued a Certificate of 
Convenience and Neces~sity without taking int·o' considera-
fion the existing transportation facilities in the territory 
.proposed to be served by applicant and the offer of exist-
ing facilities to furnish any additional or ~supplemental 
service determined by the c,o,mmission to be necessary 
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and ronvenient, thus creating- an unne•c.e,ssary duplica-
tion of service. 
( 4) The Commission has issued a c·erti:flca te of 
Convenience and N ecHssity based not upon findings of 
convenience and necessity, but on a contrast between 
rates and s-chedules of the vari·ous prote.stants, concern-
ing which no adequate findings are made, and applicant's 
pr·oposed rates and schedules. 
IV. 
BRI~EF ·O·F THE A.RJGUMEN'T. 
Error.s set forth in the first two ·c.a tegories a.re with 
respect to the Report of the c·ommission insofar a's it 
failed t·o make, or erroneously made, findings of faret. 
Certainly the Report did not pretend to be responsive to 
the allegations admitted and the issues framed in the 
pleadings filed by the parties to this. case. Plaintiff is 
mindful, however, of the test whic:h this Court laid down 
with respect to these matters in the case of Salt L·ake 
City vs. Utah Lig1h1t a.nd Traction C'omp·afYI.ty, 173 P. 55·6, 
5·2 U. 210, wherein it was said on page 56:2 of the Pacific 
Reports: 
''While it is true that the Utili tie.s Act 
·expres.sly requires the ·Commission to make find-
ings, and while it is also true th'at the commission 
should be careful to make proper findings respect-
ing the material ultimate facts upon which an 
order is ha,sed, yet we cann,o·t see wherein the 
plaintiffs, ·Or any one else could have been, or can 
·be, benefited if the findings had been far more 
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.speeific. When the findings and the opinion filed 
by tthe commission .are -considered together, as in 
this ·case we think they should be, we are of the 
·opinion that the objection that the findings are 
insufficient is not tenable, and hence that objection 
must fail.'' 
Plaintiff is also mindful of the scope of the judicial 
review ·Of the ·Commis-sion's a'Ction, this court having said 
in 1918 in the above ca.se at page 562: 
''' * * * After a careful examin~tion of 
the authorities we are more than ever eonfirmed 
in the opinion that all t:hat we can review in cases 
.of this kind is whether there is any .evidence to 
sustain the findings of the eommissi•on, whether 
it has exercised its authority according to law, 
and whether any constitutional rights of the com-
plaining party 1have been invaded or di.sregarded. 
In view that the ·commission is merely an arm of 
the Legislature through whom that !body acts in 
ma.t.ter.s of this kind, but a moment's reflection 
eonvinces any one tha.t this court may not inter-
fere eX!cept for the reasons just -stated. If inter-
ference vvere extended he;yond those limlits, it 
·w~ould, in effect, be an interference by this court 
with the lawmaking p·nwer of this state. It requires 
no argument to s:how why that may not he done. 
W·e have no more right to interfere with the dutie•s 
and powers of the Legislature than tha.t body has 
to interfere with the powers and duties impos·ed 
upon us as a court. True, the Legislature could 
perhaps have give.n us ,somewhat gr·ea.ter powers 
t.o pass upon the findings and orders of the com-
mission. Suc:h has been done in some other juris-
dictions. The Legislature of this state has, how-
ever, noit .seen fit to clothe thli.s eourt with greater 
powers of review, and we have neither the inclina-
tion nor the right to exerrc~se a power which 
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1~ neither inherent nor properly conferred. 
* * • ,, 
It may not be a1niss to note that ·only in the instant 
ease, inYolving: in so far a.s plain.tiff and at least one 
member of the 'Commission are ·concerned, a ''departur·e 
from basic or fundamental principles,''' has plaintiff 
s·oug·ht judicial review of any- ·Of the dozens of orders 
made by the P11blie Service ·Cominis~sion with respect to 
the operations of plaintiff, despite the fact that such 
orders may have been vigorously protested by pl·ain:tiff 
before the Commission. But let us consider the Report 
and Order now under review'": 
A. The Commission has failed to make findings of fact on 
the following material issues: 
(1) As to the extent of the existing service of the plain-
tiff, Utah Light and Traction Company, into the area 
affected by the application. 
(2) As to the extent of existing service into the area 
affected by the application, rendered by other common 
motor carriers and electric railroads. 
After setting forth in the preamble (R. 49) t~he con-
tents of the application, the C·om1nis.sion finds with 
respect to these matters (R. 50) ''there are at the present 
time two common carriers operating in the territory 
proposed to be served .by applicant. The Salt Lake & 
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Utah Railroad Corporation operates i:n the terri tory 
adjacent to Redw·ood Road and has five trains north into 
S'alt Lake City and five from Salt Lake City south per 
day, which stop approximately every mile to take on and 
discharge passengers. ·The Utah Light and Traction 
Company operates a bus service south upon State Street 
~s·erving Murr'ay, Midvale and Sa~dy. Its schedule is 
22¥2 minutes during the peak peri•ods and 45 minutes at 
other times.'' 
These findings do not cover the fact that the pro-
posed service would duplicate exi,sting service with the 
sole exception of cross-·county servi-ce between Draper 
and Riverton, Draper and .Midvale and Murray, Riverton 
and Midvale and· Murray, Tayl•orsville and Murray, and 
a small ·stretch between ·Taylorsville and Riverton. Yet 
this duplication is admitted by the pleadings (R. 45, 46) 
in so far as Traction ·Company is invol~ed; wa,s admitted 
by Exhibit ''' B-, (R. 34) whi,ch was prepared by the 
'Traction Company and admitted in eviden:ce as the joint 
exhibit of all parties to ·correct an errone•ous representa-
tion set forth by applicant's Exhibit (R. 8); and was 
admitted by the witne~ss Leslie W. Davis, President of 
the Airway Motor :C;oach Lines, Inc., (R. 129, Tr. 16). 
Davis testified tha:t the application did not contemplate 
any .ehange in existing .service to Mill ·Cteek, H·o~laday 
and service rendered by appli·cant under other certifi-
cates of conve.n!i·ence an·~ necessity on the east part of 
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the County to Draper<1>; that servi,ee do,\rn the center of 
the County ""'ould duplicate the present route of the Utah 
Light and Tracti,on ·Company (R. 131, Tr. 18)(2), and 
that the only additional service p·roposed over existing 
serYic.e \Yould be cr-os~S connections in the southern part 
of the County (R. 130, Tr. 17) (3). 
The Report ignores ~he fact that the Tra.cti,on Com-
pany service to ~lurray, 1\fidvale and Sandy has been 
rendered over a period from 30 to '50 years, and sinee 
(l)Q. Now~ ref€rring to the territory in the MiU Creek and Holladay 
area. As I understand the application there is no change in-
volved as far as that service is ooncerned? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Referring to the present service of the Airway rendered to the 
Draper area, there are two changes, as I understand it, ·contem-
plated; one is to eUminate the direct pre•sent route from 96th 
South and 7th East to Draper by turning west on 7th East and 
96th South, being Sandy, to State Street, and then proceeding 
south on State Street to the Draper junction, and thence east. 
Is that right? 
A. Well, no; not just exactly. \Ve intend to cut !that off at that 
east Sandy junction and turn that Draper bus around and send 
it back. Draper will be served by another bus from Murray in. 
Q. Will ther€ be any substantial change in the service to the 
Draper area over that now being rendered? 
A. Practically, no. 
(2)Q. Now, with respect to the third type of operation, the pr.e·sent 
route of lthe Utah Light and Traction Company will be duplicated, 
will it not, with the exception of your amend.ment on 64th South? 
A. With the exception of that amend·ment, and with the excepltion 
of the fact that after we get to 33rd South we wiU swing over 
to Main Streett, rather than proceed up State Street. 
(3)Q. Now, with respect to the pr·oposed service to the western part 
of the territory, Riverton, Benni<Jn, Hibbard, Taylorsville, and 
West Jordan, as I look at the exhibit the only additional service 
that is propos~d over existing service is a ·cross connection 
between West J.ordan and Midvale, and between Taylorsville 
and Murray. Is that a fair statement, Mr. Davis? 
A. And between Taylorsville and Riverton along that small red line. 
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1917 in a~cc.ordance with the orders of the defendant, 
Public Service Commission (R. 434, 'Tr. 322); and that 
the present operations are rendered in acCtnrdance with 
certificates of ·convenience and ne-cessity is,sued by the 
Public Servi,ce 1Commission (iStipulation-R. 43-3, Tr. 321). 
(3) The Commission failed to find as to whether or not 
the existing service being rendered by plaintiff in the 
territory affected is reasonably adequate to meet the 
needs of the public; and if not in what respects such 
~existing service is inadequate, and whether or not 
plaintiff has been and now is willing and ready to render 
adequate service. 
A great. deal of the testimony was directed to com-
plaints with respe-ct to the service of the Traeti,on Com-
pany. Mayor Berger said that there were a great many 
protests as to the S'clliedules and f:ares (R. 19·6, Tr. 83). 
On cross examination he admitted attending hearings 
ibefore the Public Servi~ce 'Commission with respect to 
m:ore frequent schedules and lower fares (R. 200, ·Tr. 87), 
but lhe did not recall the subsequent ·changes in ,s·chedules 
or far·es, probably . because he had not used the service 
for nearly ten years (R. 201, 1Tr. 88). Further, on cros.s 
examination he ~stated that he thought a 20 minute sched-
ule was adequate (R .. 207, Tr. 94); this incidentally was 
substantially the s-chedule of plaintiff as set forth in the 
Cbmmission 's findings ( R. 51) . 
T!he witness, Albert E. White, who used the Traction 
bus ·serviee only occasionally, was of the opinion that the 
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service of the Traction Company was not frequent 
enough, and stated thalt he had had trouble understand-
ing the fare structure (R. 236, Tr. t23). This was based 
upon hearsay (R. 241-2, Tr. 128-129) which the Commis-
sion admitted over objecti•O!l (R 241, Tr. 128). 
The witnes.s H. M. Morris, had h·ad .similar trouble 
"With respect to what he termed were frequent -changes 
in schedule and difficulti·es with the fares ('R. 2'66, Tr. 
153). He knew about the ,difficulty with resp-ect to the 
fares because he had a brother riding the bus to the 
Univer.sity (R. 267, Tr. 154). He also w.as griev·ed because. 
his motJher had told him that some months hefore a. pa.rti-
cula.r operator was '' pus·hing the people to get on the 
bus, yelling at them to get Qn. '' He him,self had no 
difficulties. (R. 270, Tr. 157). He did not ride regularly; 
'''just off and on'' (R. 2:71, Tr. 1'58). Mo1s.t of the trouble 
had occurred since a recent fare ·chan·ge; ''before they 
changed the fares everything went pretty smoothly'' 
(R. 272, Tr. 159·). 
Eennetli Farr was another witness for appli,cant in 
thi,s res·pect and was particularly wormed with respect 
to the change in fare-s of November 1'5, 19~39. However, 
on :CI"toss examination he admitted tha:t hi·s misunder-
standing could have be-en avoided ''if I had sense enough 
' to ask'' the conductor for information (R. 316, Tr. 204) ~ 
Harry Eckman was the final witness for applicant 
who testified, not for himself because he rarely rode the 
bus as he has a ~car; he felt that the ·S·chedule .south of 
Murray was very inadequate (R. 409, Tr. 297); and his 
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knowledge ahout the situation was such that he hard none 
~th respect to ·dhanges in schedules and admitted his 
testimony was "just hearsay." (R. 410, Tr. 298). 
Not one .of these witnes,ses for plaintiff w·ere regular 
patrons ,of the Tra,c:tion Company service. In contrast 
Mitchell Hayden, .appearing in his own interest, did not 
own a car and used the bus every day. He wanted the 
'Traction Company to continue to serve becaus-e their 
farHs would be cheap·er for him due to his use of the 
transfer privilege. Of ~course the more ,service and the 
lower the fares, the better. (R. 301, Tr. 188). 
J. H .. Sampson, appearing on his own initiative as 
a writness for plaintiff, was a resident of Murray, a reg-
ular patron for ·2:6. years and does not use a ear. He 
thought the .servi·ce wa:s all right, hut wanted lower fare-s. 
He too wanted the 'Traction Company to ·continue because 
the transfer privilege afforded lower fares, and if only 
the applicant should serve Murray ''it w·ould cost him 
double." (:R. 362, Tr. 250) He had found the operators 
of plaintiff to be courte,ous and efficient. (R. 365, Tr. 253) 
H. E:. Aamodt, also of Murray, had used the service 
of plaintiff regularly for 16 years. Hci.s testim·ony wa·s 
the .sam·e a.s Samp,son 's, and of 1eourse 1he wanted a more 
frequent ·s-chedule such as was giv.en in 19~39. (R .. 3-66, 
Tr. 2'54) 
With respeet to changes in schedules and fare·s, the 
testimony of Mr. Jed F. Woolley, ·General Manager of 
the Traction Comp·any, was un.c-ontradicted to the effect 
that the ~Company was willing to comply with all orders 
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of the Publi~ SerYice Commission 'vith respect to matters 
of fare, convennence t~o passengers, schedules of service 
and routing (R. 434, 'Tr. 422) : that the Company kept a 
constant "Tateh on the use of the present service and 
"Thether more serYice 'Yas needed, and took occasional 
traffic c,hecks hy actual count w·hich were available for 
public inspecti•on (R .. 435, Tr. 323); t:ha.t a route change 
south of Murray had been put into effect on order of 
the Commission (R. 4;38, Tr. 326), the effect of whi~1h 
was to eliminate certain service from State ·Street, south 
·of 48th ISouth in Murray; and th·at changes in both sch,ed-
ules and fares, inv-olving the service in question, were 
made under orders .of the Public Service C'Ommission 
during 1939 (R. 452, Tr. 340, et s.eq.) 
Finally applicant stipulated that the operator,s of 
the Traction Company handling the service in question 
had had a great deal of experience in ~service, and have 
endeavored to give ·Courte·ous servliee (R. 412, Tr. 300); 
and that the only ·change in time s-chedules .since January 
1, 1937 was that involving trial service from December, 
193:8 to December 23, 1939 operated hy ·order of the Com-
mission (R. 412, Tr. 300). Operator Wade also testified 
that the only change in fares on this line in many years 
had been the fare reduet~on effective N ov·ember 15, 193:9, 
and that after explanation to the passengers there was 
no trouble (R. 413, Tr. 301). 
Let us kee.p in min·d the statement of this court in 
the case of Los Angeles lf· Salt Lake Railroad Compwny 
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V'S. PUJbl!ic Utilities Commission, l5 P. (2d) 3:58, 80 U. 
455, "'There is no absolute standard ·o.f a reasonable, 
adequate, ·or efficient. ·s·ervice. There is a point· at which 
almost .any one might S'ay that servic.es were inadequate, 
'and theTe is a point above which almost any one could 
~say that the railroad ·Company was giving more in the 
way. ,of fa,cilities than it .should he required to give. But 
in between these points it w·ould he somewhat of a.matter 
of each man's judgment as to what the quantum of 
servi-ce ·should he * * * '' (in order to meet the require-
ment of i8eetion 7'6-3-1, R. S. U. 19-33). 
In view ·Of the testimony of Mayor Berger we might 
also ·call the ·C'ourt's attention to the ·cases .(~'ollated in the 
P. U. R. Digest, "Monopoly and Competition", Section 
50, where the cases are uniform in holding that popular 
dissatisfaction with existing ~service because of some 
pers~onal animosity i·s no reason for authorization of 
competing service. In this conneetion we submit that it 
was .significant that none of t'he several hundred regular 
pa tftons of the servi-ce appeared at the hearing in ,support 
of the Application; that on the contrary several regular 
patrons appeared to protest the Application, some of 
whom did so without solicitati·nn on the part of this 
··Protestant. ·This testimony contrasts with that of the 
following witnesses for the Applic:ant. 
Mayor Berger: Hiasn 't used the bus for years; C'om-
missi,oner Hansen. Never uses the bus himself; Albert· 
E. White: Uses the bus just occas~onally; H. M. Mor·ris: 
Us·es the bu.s occasionally; Kenneth Farr : Rides the bu·s 
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from the University of Utah to Murray (The proposed 
serYice 'rill eertainly n·ot help him even as to fare~) ; 
HarrY Eckman: RarelY rides the bus. 
~ . 
Despite the admitted efforts by applicant and the 
city officials ·of ~Iurra.y, the attack made on the adequacy 
of Pr{)testant's serYice to Murray, Midvale and Sandy 
w·as not substantiated. 
This Pflotestant is ready to cooperate with full 
investigations in connection w·ith complaints made either 
to Protestant or to the Public ·Serviee .Commission that 
its service or rates or schedules in any de~tail a.re 
improper or inadequate. It had n•o notice, however, that 
the Application of the Airway Motor ~c·oach Lines, Inc., 
f.or a. c.ertificate of convenience and necessity in ·this 
case, would be a. clearing house with respect to these 
matters. ,, .... e submit that to :hottom the issuance of a 
certificate of ~onvenienee and necessity ·on ·such .evidence 
and immaterial issues would be a violation of fun·da-
mental concepts, a. view· perhaps shared by the Commis-
sion in this ease aeeounting for the silence of the Rep,ort 
with respect to Findings on this pha~se of the evidence. 
And if Findings were to be made, the evidence eould 
afford no other .conclusion but that the existing service 
was adequate; this is certainly to be presumed from the 
fact that the serviee as to r-outing, fares and s·chedule.s 
was rendered in aecordance with orders of the Defend-
ant Public .Service Commission, empowered and charged 
under the statutes (Sec. 5, Chapter 65, LHws ?f Utah 
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1'93'5) to assure the public the standard of serVIce 
prescribed by Section 76-3-1. 
( 4) The ·Commission has failed to find whether or not the 
existing service being rendered by protestants other 
than plaintiff in the territory affected is reasonably 
adequate to meet the needs of the public; and if not 
in what respects such existing service is inadequate~ 
and whether or not said protestants have been and now 
are ready and willing to render adequate service. 
With respect to the service of the Salt. Lake & Utah 
· ·Railroad Company, witness Henry Bringhurst of Ben-
nion thought that the Salt Lake· & ·Utah Railr·oad ·Com-
pany op-erated three trips per day (R. 246, Tr. 133), 
although the ~Commission found it. to be :a fact that five 
trips each wa.y were operated daily (R. 51). 
·The witness Davis admitted t~ha.t he had erred with 
respect to his eonsidera tion of the service rendered by 
the ·Salt Lake & Utah Railroad ·Ciornpany, having assun1ed 
that the .Salt Lake & Utruh. provided but two trains per 
day. He did not know anything with respect to where 
.service was rendered or what the time schedules W·ere. 
He signed the application in question without carefully 
.c-onsidering the,se matters (R. 147-8, Tr. 34-5). The 
d!i.screpancies in the 1nap at~t1ached t~o the application and 
E·xhibit B (R. '34) ~have already been pointed ·out. 
T;he Commission ~should have n1ade a. finding on this 
point, and as in the case of (c) above, the evidence will 
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only support a finding' that this existing .service wa.s 
adequate and "~as being rendered pursuant to order,s of 
the Publi·e SerYice ·C'ommiss1on. 
(5) The Commission failed to find what service, if any, 
into territories other than those now served by plain-
tiff and other protestants, is necessary and convenient 
and in the public interest, and whether or not plaintiff, 
or other protestants, has been and now is ready and 
willing to render such service. 
Witness ·Henry Bringhurst (R. 244, Tr. 13'1) testified 
that he lived in Bennion with a population of ahout 400; 
that transportation facilities were confined to the Salt 
Lake & Utaili Railroad (in the extent of whose serviee 
he was about 50% wrong as above pointed out) and to the 
use of individual ca.rs which were owned hy practically 
every family in Bennion (R. 248, Tr. 135); that four or 
:five buses per ·day to Salt Lake would be good s€rvice 
(R. 250, Tr. 137) (the same number of trips bein-g 
rendered by the Salt Lake & Utah Railr;oad ·C;ompany 
unknown to witness); tha.t .about 16 to 18 people per day 
travel :b-etween Bennion and !S;alt Lake, 90% of whom 
would use applicant's buse·s instead of private convey-
ances ·Or the ,Salt Lake & Utah (R. 2·56, Tr. 143); and that 
he was not interested in ·Costs, but only in service to the 
community (R .. 255, Tr. 142). We submit this 1testimony 
may support an argument that the additional service is 
convenient, but certainly not necessary. 
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·The same pertains to the testimony of ~George Hyde 
of ·Cres·c.ent living 3/8 of ~a mile west ,of the State High-
way (State Street); he had dis,cus.sed the proposed 
service and thought that 90lfo of the 200 people in east 
and l·nwer 'Cres-cent were favorable to a bus line; (R. 261, 
Tr. 148); that about 100~/o :of the families in this di·strict 
had ·cars, but that it would he a n.ice tlhing if there could 
be a bus in addition; that he was not interested in costs 
of operation, but in service and what the patrons would 
have to pay (R·. 264. Tr. 151). Incidentally the Town of 
Cres-cent already has bus service furnished by the 'Salt 
Lake & Utah Railroad Company (Exhibit B, Record 
471, Tr. 359'). 
D'avid Harker (R. 283, ·Tr. 170) and John Pixton 
(R. 287, Tr. 174) of Taylorsville have wanted more ~serv-
ic.e; through Pixton 's ·compLaints and orders ·of the Public. 
Service ·Commission, service was inc.reased by the 
Traction ·Company to Murray for a year to a;hout the 
2.4th day of December, 19·39, but the additional patrtonage 
did not :Support the increased service .and the ·extra bus 
was discontinued; fares have been 1slig[htly redu~d; 
Pixton believes there is a. cry~ng need for bus service 
bet'ween Taylorsville- and Murray; there a.re about 150 
to 1'6·5 families in Taylorsville, lots of whom work or 
are students in Salt Lake and drive their cars in to 
Salt Lake .and take their neighbors; Pixton felt it to 
be very iwconv'enrient not to have a 10c fare to Murray 
and a 2!2. minute S·chedule (R. 289, Tr. 176). 
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Jleredith Page of Riverton (R. 335, Tr. 2:23) testi-
fied that there are about 3,000 ·persons in Bluffdale, L·a.rk 
and H·a.rriman ~ that the people in RiYerton comment in 
favor of buses and better serYices; that there a.re two or 
three carloads of private cars and students tr1avelin.g to 
Salt Lake each day; and that bus service would be a lot 
more cant· enie1l.f ( R. 338, Tr. 226). (Incidentally Lark 
is eight miles and Harriman six miles from the territory 
proposed to be serYed by the applicant.) Page is an 
automobile dealer and most of the people in this vicinity 
have their own ears, but bus service ,as a stavnd-by con-
venience in addition to private -conveyances and the Salt 
Lake ·& Utah ''ould be an advantage (R. 339-340, Tr~ 
227-228). 
Royal \T. Beckstead of 1S•outh Jordan testified that 
there are about 800 people in his .community which was 
served by the Salt Lake & Utah Railroad c~ompany 
(R. 342, Tr. 230); that w1hen people travel from his 
community they go to Midvale and on through to Murray 
and Salt Lake; tha.t most of these people now own and 
travel by their own cars (R. 343, Tr. 231); that.in addi-
tion the school district renders bus service for the 
children; (R. 344, Tr. 23~2); and that three bus trips a 
day would be an additional convenience. if some one 
could not use their priva.te cars or use existing facilities 
(R. 344, Tr. 232). 
Witness H. W. Jorgensen of West Jordan said that 
the pe~ople in his vicinity, about thirteen to fourteen 
hundred, were served by the Salt Lake & Utah Railroad 
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Company (R,. 347, Tr. 235); were served by the Jordan 
B';chool District as far as attenda.n·ce at school was con-
cerned (R. 351, Tr. 239') ; iand either used their own cars 
or walked when they did not use the public facilities 
('R. 3154, Tr. 242.). The proposed cross-1Ctounty service 
would be better than the present lack of public facilities 
in tha.t. respect ( R. 363, 'Tr. 241). 
John M. Peterson of Draper represented the Draper 
Chamiher of ,C;ommerce (R. 384, Tr. 272). Draper had 
been served by the applicant for about six months (R. 
3'85, Tr. 273). He had heard no ·eomplaints about this 
service, hut the more hours of the day that the service 
could be handled the better. He would also like to have 
service from D-raper to Bin~ham and Lark and to Magna 
and Arthur (R. 386, Tr. 274). (Of ·eourse Bingham, L~ark, 
Magna and Arthur are not included in the prop,osed 
~service.) He also thought that there would he quite a 
deSire -to. go from D~rap~er to Riverton, but in oheeking 
the schedules .on ~cross examination found tha.t the 
pr,o:posed serviee would hardly rfit this need (R·. 391, 
Tr. ·2.79'). 
rnhe testimony of Joseph Bennion of Taylorsville 
was similar to that of the other witnesses for .applicant 
(R. 3156, Tr. 244). 
Witne;ss Woolley for the 'Traction ·Clomp any, whose 
qu-alifications in the pub lie mass tra.nsporta t.ion field were 
stipulated, testified that he had p·ersonally checked the 
territory in question and was familiar with the density 
of population and the .possibilities •of obtaining revenue 
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passengt~rs from mass transportation ~bus operation in 
that vicinity, operating· either horizontally to feed the 
State Street line, or n•orth and south of Redwood Road, 
and bas~d upon this testimony stated -hci.s opinion that 
the territory 'Yould not support the cost of operation, 
(R. 440, Tr. 328). This testimony was likewise adopted 
by stipulation by the Salt Lake & Utah Railroad ;Com-
pany ( R. 44a, Tr. 331). 
In contr:ast, witness Davis for applicant, stated 
that he had made no definite estim·ate of revenue, but 
that frle felt that the territory "\vould support the cost of 
the proposed service, and if it did not, ap·pli,cant would 
resquest authorit:y to reduce or abandon service (R. 138, 
Tr. 25). 
Plaintiff submits that it would be difficult to make 
·out a stronger ·Case to show that there is no necessity 
for bus ·service into the proposed new territory than was 
made by the applicant. The most that the testimony of 
applicant's 'vitnesses in this respect can support is a 
finding that the proposed mass transportation operati,ons 
would be .a .convenient standby service £or a majority of 
the people, and could not hope to· pay the bare costs of 
operation. 
A glance at Exhibit ''B" a map originally p-repared 
by applicant, but corrected by protestants by stipulation 
to eliminate a deceptive appearance and to show the true 
situation, indi,cates at once that the applicant renders 
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·service into the entire e;ast end of Salt Lake ·County; the 
Tra<;.tion Company to the. c-entral part; and the Salt 
LHke & Utah Railroad Company to the "'estern part and 
th~ south-central part; .and the only gaps are the cr~oss­
county co~ne-etions which the appl~cant has thrown in 
by way of a stU!b bus operation, ( R .. 130, Tr. 17), f,or the 
purpose of acquiring public. .support 'vith the success 
illustrated by the testimony ,of J·ohn M. Peter·son of 
Draper. This witness was particularly anxious on behalf 
of the Draper Chamber of ;Commerce for cross-county 
servi,ce from Draper to Bingham, Lark, Magna and 
Arthur (R. 386, Tr. · 274). His attention 'vas called to 
the fact that the scope ,of the present application involved 
only .service between Draper and Riverton, which he felt 
would he well taken ear.e of by granting the application. 
But on cross examination it developed that the schedule 
of applicant (which he had not seen previously) would 
leave him stranded in Riverton without a possibility of 
returning, (R. 391, Tr. 279). 
C.ertainly if there is a need it is not of the publi.c 
as a. whole, but only of a few individuals whose husbands 
hav-e their cars, or who, for .some other reason, de·sire a 
convenient standby service w1hich can be taken rather 
than any other n1e:ans ·of reaching a particular destina-
tion. In this applicant's witnesses were unanimous. 
~:rhe Report of the ·Commission makes no finding at 
all -on this issue, except to com·men.t that some of the 
terri tory has bus service and s·ome has not, and to con-
clude that '' * * * even though 'some of the territory 
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is no'\Y being given c-on1n1on ·carrier service, public cori-
venienc.e and necessity would justify the issuance of t!he 
authority requested by the a.pplie.a.nt, so that the afore-
mentioned territory \Yhich does not now have common 
carrier serviee might be afforded the opportunity ().f 
such service." (R. 52). 
Plaintiff submits that, were· findings to be made on 
the above evidence, a.pplica.n t has failed to meet i t.s 
burden of proof to show that the prop·o,sed serviee would 
not only be a. ·eonvenience, but also a reasonable neces.sity 
for the p:voposed service as distinguished fr?m the CJon-
venien-ce. While the word· ''necessity" is not used in 
the sense that the ·service must he essential or absolutely 
indispensable, still the need mu·st be such as to warrant 
the expense of making the impr.ovement. In other words, 
mere ·c.onvenience is not eno-ugh, but the inconvenience 
occasioned by· lack of service requested must be so gre~t 
as to amount to a necessity not only of individuals, but 
to the people of the community or territory a.ffeeted at 
large and as a whole. (Railroa.d Co. vs. State, (Okla.) 
252 P. 849·; Fornarotto vs. Public Utility Com.mission.ers, 
(N. J.) 143 Atl. 450.) But there are no Findings at all! 
Finally it should be pointed out that the findings d>O 
not ·cover the undisputed evidence o.f plaintiff that the 
'Traction ·Company had been and then was willing to 
.comply with all lawful ·Orders of the Public IS.ervice C·om-
mission with res~pect to its existing operations, (R. 434, 
Tr. 322) and with respect to ·extensions of .service (R. 439, 
Tr. 3'27). T.his testimony adduced through witness 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
Woolley on behalf both .of the Traction Com.p-any and 
the :Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Oompany was repeated 
(
1R. 43, Tr. 331) in order that there ·Could be no misunder-
~standing of the attitude of the protestants. <4> 
( 6) The Commission failed to make findings as to whether 
or not the proposed service would be an unnecessary 
duplication of existing service rendered by plaintiff and 
othetr protestants. (5) 
We discus·s hereinafter the reasons why the finding 
on this issue, if made, w·ould have to he that the proposed 
serv.ice would be an unnecessary duplicati,on. The point 
made here is that there is no finding re,sponsive to this 
important issue. 
B. - The Commission has made Findings of Fact not sup-
ported by any substantial evidence: 
Not only has the Commission failed to make findings 
on material .and necessary issues, but in at le:ast f:our 
(4) "Mr .. Behl·e: This is repetition, but I want to make the point clear. 
Mr. Woolley .. as manager of the Traction Company, if the Com-
mission ,should determine by lawful proceedings that there is a 
need f.or additional s-ervice, and should so find, is your company 
willing to comply witth aLI lawful orders of the Commission with 
respect to the rendering of such additional service? 
"Mr. Woolley: Yes, sir. 
"Mr. Behle: And like·wise, with respect to any changes or modi-
fications with respect to the existing service now being rendered 
by your company? 
"Mr. Woolley: Yes." 
(5) See Point C-3, page 4.S infra. 
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respects its so-called findings are not supported by any 
substantial evidence in the record. 
(1) ·On page 3 of the R.eport (R. 51) the Commission 
finds: 
"'The rates now· in effect are the lowest tha.t 
this C·ommission has been able to procure. How-
·ever, voluntary reductions would at any time have 
been in order. \Vb.e:a the C·ommission has sought 
reductions the attitude of the Traction Company 
has been till. at the op·eration of this line, as als•o 
the operation of the Traction ,system as a whole, 
yielded little or no return upon the investment, 
and if the Murray-Sandy line were granted fur-
ther reductions, it would mean that the now 
meager n;et returns ,of the T;rac:tion C'ompany 
would be further reduced and the users of the 
service in Salt Lake City would be forced to carry 
in part the ·costs of the service beyond the city 
limits.'' (R.eport p. 3, R. 51). 
The .present personnel of this Commission were 
parties :before this Court in the ease of McCa.rthy vs. 
Public Service Commission of Utah, 77 P. (2d) 331, 9·4 
Utaili. 304, wherein thi~s court said, on page 338, with 
respect to the Commission's claim that it could consider 
its own records in connection with any application: 
''' * * * It does not .app·ear, however, that 
these rooords or permits were p·ut in evid·ence ~nr 
made .part of the record before t'he Commission 
in the matter of the permit No. 125, or in the 
later reeord made upon plaintiffs' petition for 
rehearing •nr reconsideration. In such case they 
are not properly a part ·of the record on review 
in this court. Los Angeles & :S. L. R. ·C'o. v. Pu,blic 
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Utilities C'ommis·sion, 81 Utah 286, 17 P. 2d 287, 
291; Spencer v. Industrial Commissi:on, 81 Utah 
'511, 20 P. 2d 618. Plaintiffs were never con-
fronted with such re{~to·rds as .evidence and have 
iha.d no opportunity before the 'Commission to 
oppose them with obje-ctions as to competency, to 
the inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom, 
or to rebut the same by other evidence. They are 
I\Ot affected thereby in this eourt. '' 
Yet that portion .of the report above quoted departs 
from any evidence at the hearing in setting forth as 
findings, presumably material to the result reached by 
the c·ommis·si·on, statements with respect to certain 
informal conferences whi.ch the Tr.a.ction Company pur-
portedly had with the Commission. Plaintiff, until the 
time of the promulgation of the Report and Order now 
under review, had no intimation that the Commission 
would depart from the record, had no opportunity to 
cross examine on thls "testimony", was not confronted 
with these records as evidence, and w.as not given an 
· opportunity to oppose the inference's drawn therefrom. 
(2) On page 3 of the Report (R. 51) the 'Commission 
also mak.es a finding, or at least a contrast, !between the 
present rates ·of protestants and the proposed rates. 
Plaintiff submits that the record is barren of any such 
contrast of 46 percent, and of eourse the proposed rates 
of prot·estants do not appear in the Report on which this 
fallacious contrast is based. 
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E:rllibit 1-C (R. 42) contrasts the proposed fa.res of 
applicant and the fares of the Salt Lake & Utah Railroad 
·Corporation. Ex.hibit '''E" (R. 38) sets forth the Trac-
tion Company fare.s, and the proposed :fares ,olf the 
Airwa.ys a.re set forth in full on page 2 of its application 
(R. 2). The percentage figure us-ed by the .Commis.sion 
appears incorrect. Yet this .portion of the Rep•ort ha~s 
been widely quoted throughout Salt Lake County in order 
to gain popular support for the applicant, no mention 
being made of the other general statement on page 4 of 
the Report, (R. 52) tha.t ''In the cases of students, trans-
ferees and riders with weekly passes, the rates of the 
Traction Company are deeidedly more favorable than 
the rates proposed by the appli~ant. * * * '' 
(3 & 4) The Report ·On pa·ge 4 (R. 5·2) finds: 
'' * * * there is at the present time no 
reason to suppose that such . patrons will not 
-continue to enjoy the benefits of these rates.'' 
Again on page 7 of the Report (R. 55) the Commis-
sion finds: 
"The granting of this application will not 
·substantially detra·ct from nor impair existing 
• • ::ll: * * '' common carr11,er sem;ce .. . 
Not only is there no evidence to supp·ort such find-
ings to the effect tha.t the Traction ,Qnmpany or the Salt 
Lake & Ut~h Railroad Company will not suffer from the 
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proposed •COmpeti·tion, but nhe evidence, and the admis-
sions in the ple·adings are all to the contrary. 
We have heretofore pointed out that applicant 
admitted through the pleadings the fact that that part 
of the propos-ed service in so far as .operations between 
Salt Lake C.ity, Murray, Midvale and 18andy were con-
·cerned, was ''in direct -conflici'' with the existing service 
,of plaintiff. ('R. 45 ). 1The defendant, Airway Motor 
·Coacih Lines, Inc:., further admitted in the pleadings that 
the granting of its a;pplication w·ould je~opa:rdize the 
ability .of plain.tiff to ,oovn1timlue to render service south. of 
Thirty-third Sowth (R. 46). Responsive to this admis-
si;on the Wi.tne,ss Davis testified with respect to this 
duplication (R·. 1~29-131, Tr. 16-lS, :and quotations from 
testimony set forth in foot-notes 1 to 3 supra). On cr,oss 
examinat.ion he stated that '' * * * there isn't room 
for ·our operations and the ·Traction C!ompany operations 
in this territory.'' (R. 164, '·Tr. ·51) ; that by vtirtue of 
applicant ''s lower rates, ,more frequent ·s,chedules, easier 
riding equipment, more -courteous treatment of passen-
·gers and better salesmanship, the Airways eould success-
fully eompete with the Traction ·Company's servi-ce, but 
that if the 1Trac:tion Company lowered its rates to compete 
with thos-e ·Of the Airways, "that might work quite a 
hardship upon us" (R. 165, ·Tr. 512.). T!hese adm1s~s1ons 
a,nd this testimony ,are consistent with the tes,timony of 
the witness Woolley for the Traction Company,' to the 
-effeet that the result of the p·roposed dup·li:cation would be 
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that there 'Yould not be enough revenue "f.or either ·one 
to eYen come JJ.ear breakin·g· eYen" (R. 459, Tr. 347). 
T1hus the Order of the Commission (if sustained), 
based in part upon these erroneous Findings, is now 
creating and "'"ill continue to create a situation of 
disastrous a.nd destruetiYe eompetition, harmful not only 
to the partie-s involved~ but to the public-the puhli·c 
w·hich, based ·On S'ad exp·er;ienees along this line, had 
legislated to prevent su.Ch situations from arising again. 
For the reas-ons hereinabove .set forth plaintiff sub-
mits that the Report and ·Order under review s~hould 1he 
vacated and set aside, and the proceedings remanded to 
the defendant Public Service C:ommission, with directions 
to cDmply with the law and make proper Findings. As 
this Court has said, ''the Commis·sion .should be careful 
to ·make proper finding-s respe-cting the material ultimate 
facts upon which an order is based,'' and if this had 
been done in the instant case, the errors hereinafter 
discussed may not h·ave oecurred. 
C. Tlie action of the defendant Commission in issuing the 
Report ana Order under review is contrary to law, in 
violation of statute, and arbitrary and capricious, in 
the following particulars: 
(1) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity although applicant has not obtained 
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fmnchises or licenses from the local County and City 
auth~rities concerned, as required by law. 
The Commission,by its order has is.sued a C:ertificate 
of C'onvenience and N eces·sity, although defendant,. Air-
way Motor Coach Lines, Inc., has not obtained franchises 
or licenses from the local ·Ctounty and city authorities 
~concerned, as required by law. Sub-section 3 of Section 
7'6-4-24, Revised .Statutes of Utah 1933, .specifically dire.cts 
the ·Commis·sion to condition the granting .of a certificate 
upon a sihowing that : 
''' * * * such applicant .~has receiv.ed the 
required ·Consent, franchise or permit of the 
proper county, state, municip~ality or other puhlic 
authority. * * * If a public utility desires to 
exercise .a right or privilege under a franchise or 
permit which it .contemplates securing hut "\vhich 
has not yet been granted to it, such public utility 
may ·apply t;o the Commis~sion for an order 
preliminary to the is·suing of the certificate. T·he 
Commission may thereupon make an order declar-
ing that it will, therefore, upon application, under 
such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, 
issue the desired certifica:te upon such terms and 
·Conditions as it may designate after the public 
utility ha.s obtained such eontemplated franchise 
or permit. Upon presentation to the Commission 
of evidence satisfactory to it that such franchise 
-or permit has been secured by such public utility, 
the C:ommission shall thereup!on issue · such 
certificate.'' 
Paragraph 13: ·of the Application admitted that the 
applieant did· not yet have these franchises (R. 3) but 
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stated that arrangen1ents 1had been made for obtaining 
the necessary franchises or licenses. The testimony 
supported this allegation (R. 148, Tr. 3'5). C·ertainly the 
Commission had this requirement in mind when Commis-
sioner Holbrook called this matter t·o the attention of 
applicant (R. 153, Tr. 40). 
As stated by 'Yitness Davis .at this time, (R. 153, Tr. 
40), the applicant was follo·w·ing the second alternative 
provided by the statute above quoted. Yet the Commis-
si·on mas not only ·made no finding responsive to the 
allegations of the Applieation and to the undisputed 
testimony, but failed to follow the statute in the parti-
culars aibove quoted and granted the certificate effective 
immed1atel~ .... Thus applicant under the Report and Order 
under revie'Y possesses a certificate of convenience and 
necessity, but has n·ot obtained a permit, franchise, or 
license from Salt Lake City, Murray, Midvale or Sandy, 
or from any of the other conununitie.s. This situation 
was not only not contemplated by th-e statute, but is 
ex,pres.sly prohibited thereby. 
(2) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity despite evidence on which it itself has 
found that applicant has not the financial ability to 
to properly perform the service proposed. 
(3) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity without taking into consideration the 
existing transportation facilities in the territory p-ro .. 
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posed to be served by applicant and the effect of the 
proposed service thereon and the otfer of existing 
facilities to furnish any additional or 1Supplemental' 
se~rvice determined by the Commission to be necessary 
and convenient, thus creating an unnecessary duplica-
tion of service. 
( 4) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity based not upon findings of convenience 
and necessity, but on a contrast between rates and 
schedules of the various protestants, concerning which 
no adequate findings are made, and applicant's proposed 
mtes _ and schedules. 
Before dealing with the f.nregoing vital points may 
we outline briefly our conceptions .of the basic scope and 
limitations of and upon the administrative process which 
we contend the Public SeTvice Commission failed to 
apprehend. 
:We conc.eive the fundamental nature of the adminis-
trative proce-ss to be well stated in the recent opinion of 
the Utah Supren1e Court in the case of Rowell vs. Sta.te 
Boa.rd 01f Agriculture, 99 P. (2d) 1, ______ U. ------, wherein it 
is said: 
''That the Legislature may not surrender or 
delegate its legislative power is elemental. 
''It may, ~however, provide for the exeeution 
through administrative agencies of its legislative 
p·olicy, and may confer upon such administrative 
officers -certain p·o·wers and the duty of determin-
ing the question of the existence o.f certain facts 
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upon 'Yhirh the effect or execution of its legisla-
tiYe policy 1na~T be dependent. * * * 
"B.ut in the delegation ·of such authority the 
Leg·islature must clearlY mark the course to he 
' . 
pursued, and th·e principles., facts and purp·o·ses to 
serve as g-uide posts to enable the offic:er to carry 
out, not ~his O\Y11 will or judgment but that of the 
Leg-islature. * * *'' 
As we all know the Legislature of the 1State of Utah 
in 1917 created the Public Servi·ce C·ommission a.s an 
3dministrative agency f.or the purpose of p.roviding for 
the execution of its legislative ·policies with respect to 
public utilities. Upo.n the Public Service C·ommis.sion 
was conferred by the Legislature of this State eertain 
powers and responsrhilities, including the duty of deter-
mining the question of the existence ·of certain facts upon 
which the execution of the legislative polic:y of the State 
of Utah may be dependent. 
The public policy laid down by the L·egislature w'as 
a mandate for a regulated monop-oly in the public utility 
field for reas•o1ns familiar to any student of the public 
utility question. In the case of Gi~mer vs. Public Utilities 
Commission, 247 P. 284, 67 U. 22~2, decided in 1926, this 
eourt said on page 287 : 
"* * * Mr. Spurr, hy reas·on of his posi-
tion as the editor of the Publi-c Utilities Reports, 
is no doubt well qualified to .speak upon the sub-
j.ect of sta;te control of public utili·ties. In diiscuss-
ing that subject in volume 1 of his work entitled 
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Guiding principles of Public Service R-egulation, 
at page 31, the author says: 
,., 'What do these provisions -of the 
statutes with reference to certificates of 
public convenience and nHcessity signify~ As 
.a matter of policy, why .should a public utility 
·company require commission consent before 
beginning .operation while those engaged in 
~private enterprises can do business where 
they will~ Public •and private industries were 
once on the same footing in this respe·ct. The 
maxim that competiti·on is the life of trade 
was held to apply to public as well as primte 
business. C·ompetition, being thought well 
of, was weLcomed in all kinds of business. 
Experience proved, however, that business 
rivalry in the publi.c utility field was had, 
both for the companies and the public. S1o 
the policy of discouraging rather than en-
•couraging competition between public service 
companies was adopted.' '' 
This ·case involved motor carriers wh·o .desired to pa.rti-
·cip~ate in the available business on a competitive basis, 
and •on page 289 the Court said : 
'·' * * * ·Every public utility necess,arily 
must operate in accordance with both the letter 
and the spirit ·of the Public Utiliti-e.s Act and the 
authorized conditions imposed by the commission. 
The v·ery purpose of the Ut·ilities Act is to- prevent 
one public wtility from destroying another. When, 
therefore, it is made app.arent t~o the commission 
that the increase of the number of ve•hicles or 
trips by a :eommon -carrier which is using the 
public sitreets and highways must necessarily 
result in seriously affecting the ability of another 
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utility to render serYice, or perhaps destroy its 
ability to do s·o, where the serviee is rendered hy 
the other ,public ut·ility partly in N1e sa.n1e territory 
and partly in territory extending beyond the terri-
tory served by the utility first mentioned, the 
commission undoubtedly may interfere to prevent 
sueh disastrous results. T·he com.mls.s[:on wa.s 
created for that very purp-ose, and, where its 
orders are within its jurisdiction and the bounds 
of reas·on, and are not capricious and arbitrary, 
this court c.annot interfere.'' (Italics ours). 
Lest one think that this public poli.c.y of regulated mono-
poly has been changed in the intervening years to one of 
reguLated competition despite the eontinuanc~ on the 
books of the same Statutes, we quote from the opinion of 
the same court in 19:38, where in the case of McCarthy 
vs. Public Service Commission of. Utah, supra, it is s.aid 
on page 335 of 77 P. (2d): 
·•' * * * The available supply ·o.f business 
over a given route or over all routes covered .bY 
their ·common facilities ·is the source from which 
the earnings of each carrier must come. Whatever 
subtracts from the total volume of business is 
a diminution of earning -capacity for those who 
·must compete for :and share in the remainder and 
who have equipped themselves at large expense 
for carrying a larger share of the business. True, 
no carrier has a property interest in any specific 
bu8'iness ~or shipment until he actually gets it, 
.connects with it, appropriates i:t, by contracting 
therefor with the shipper. But he is entitled to 
his cha.n·ce as a co-mpetito-r at all the business there 
is as against anyone proceedi·ng unlawfully or 
without due authorization of the statute to divert 
·or ·appropria·te any part of it. The rights of com-
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peting ·Carriers to share in a stream o.f transport-
ation business flowing ~over a given route or high-
way may well be likened to the rights of rival or 
competing appropriators of water from a natural 
S'tream or source of supply, wher'e there is insuf-
ficient water in the source to fully satisfy the 
wants or needs of all. In such -case, every a.ppro-
p.ria tor or user of water has a beneficial interest 
in prot·ecting the supply of -water in the natural 
.stre.aJm from unlawful diminution, even before it 
reaches his own ·headgate and hefore he has made 
:any ·specific water in the stream his ·own. And he 
is entitled to his ·day in court or a hearing before 
the official charged with policing the stre.am and 
distributing the water of the S'tream, to protest 
against any unlawful act of wastage or distribu-
tion of the water. '' 
And again on page 3,37 : 
''·Every such permit, every act of transporta-
tion, tends t.o p·roduce eompeti tion for busine-ss, 
and increased activity to get and control business. 
But ·compe-tition is not, i~n itself and always, a 
benefit to t·he public. ·o-r in the public jnterest; not 
any more than i~s 'monopoly always in the public 
interest. Rather, it lies in a medium between the 
two. A!s well said in a recent case, People's Tran-
sit C·o. v. H;enshaw, 8 Cir., 20 F. 2d 87, at page 90: 
'' 'The results of sueh competition, where 
there is not sufficient business to ;sustain all 
of the .competitors, is that a season of experi-
ence cause·s all or some to drop out or com-
pels the purchase of competitors (usually at 
exaggerated amounts), thus ·ea.using an in-
-crease of ,c!api tal exp-enditure .of the pur-
·Cihasers upon which the charges to the public 
mus't be based and thereby increased. 
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~ ~ ~ rrhese considerations, and others, 
an1ply justify differenees to protect and 
prest"\l'Yl~ the existing permanent sys~tem. No 
ne\Y system has a le·g·al right to destroy such 
existri.ng systPm and haYe the publir at its 
mercy. The :public \Yelfare is not served, but 
harn1ed there:by. The public may protect 
itself against such resu}ts. Nor can any 
theory of free competiti,on CJhange this situa-
tion. C:on1petition is recognized and en-
co-uraged for the sole reason that it is .sup-
poS<ed to result in the public good. But 
C'Ompetiti·on is not neces·s1arly unrestrainable. 
It cannot be allo\Yed to harm the very public 
it \Yas de~signed to protect and aid. It m.ay 
be restrained for the public \velfare just the 
same as monopoly may be restrained or as 
competition 1nay be left unrestra;ined. ·The 
test in each in,st·ance is the publi'C good. 
Where the restraint upon competition is f,or 
the public good, it is sustainable just as 
restraint up-on freedom ,of acti·on by the 
individual is valid where for the.public good. 
Such is the basis of and the reason for the 
entire police power.' '' 
ITisofar ·as public utilities are concerned, the Legis-
lature of this state, ''testing'' the public good, has deter-
mined by Title 76 tn create and regulate monopolies. 
In 193-5 the Act was amended with respe-ct to .common 
ID·otor carriers and by the provisions of Section 5, Chap-
ter 65, Laws ·of Ut•ah 1935, the Public Service Commission 
was empowered and charged as foll·ows: 
'' 76-5-5. ·C'ommon motor carriers -Powers 
.and duties ·Of eom'missi,on. The commissi-on is 
v-ested with po·uJer and aut ho1·ity, a;nd it shall be 
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its duty, to sutpervise and regula1te all common 
motor carriers and to fix, alter, rergulate and de-
termine just, fair, reasonable and sufficient rates, 
fares, ·charges and elassifications; to regulate the 
f.a.eilities, accounts, .serviee and safety ,of opera-
tions of ea;ch sl}ch common motor ·carrier, to reg-
ulate operating and ·time schedules so as to meet 
t1he needs of any c.ommuni ty, and s-o a.s to insure 
.adequate transportation serviee to the territory 
traversed hy such common motor carriers, and so 
as to prevent u1vnecessary dup.Zioation of service 
betUJ'een these common motor carriers, arnd be-
tween them aflrt.d the lines of compe1ting stearn and 
electric railroads; and the ·eommission may 
require the ·C:o-ordina.tion ·of the service and sched-
ules of -competing common ca.rrier.s by motor 
vehicles or ·electric .and steam railroads, to require 
the filing of annual and other reports, tariffs, 
s-ehedules and other data by such .common mtOtor 
carriers, and to supervis·e a!nd regulate such com-
mon motor carriers in all rna tters affecting the 
rela,tion betw·een su0h common motor carriers and 
the public and between ·such common motor car-
riers and other ·common carriers, to the end that 
the provisions of this chapter may be fully and 
conipl·etely earried ·out. The comn1ission shall 
have power and authority, by general order or 
:otherWJise, to prescribe rule's and regulations in 
·conformity wi~th this act applica!ble to any and 
all sucJh eommon mot•or carriers, and to do all 
things_nece,ss·ary to carry out and enforce the 
provisions of this a:ct. All laws relating to the 
powers, duties, authority, and jurisdiction of the 
commisision o¥er eommon c.arrtiers are hereby 
.made applicable to all su·ch -common motor carriers 
·except as herein otherwise specifi·c,ally provided.'' 
With respect to the issuance of certifi-cates of con-
venience and neeessi ty the Legislature by Secti,on 6 of 
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Chapter 65, preseribed ''guide posts'' to enable the 
Commission to ·Oa.rry out, not the judgment or will of the 
Comnrission, but that of the Legislature, in the follow-
ing· terms: 
'' * * * Before granting· a Certific.ate to 
a comn1on m·otor earrier the ~Cormnissi~on shall 
take into consideration the financial ability of the 
applicant to properly perform the servi~ce sought 
under the Certificate and also the character of 
the high\Yay over \Yhich said ·c.a.m~mon m·otor car-
rier proposes to operat·e .a'nd the ·effect thereon, 
and upon the traveling public using the same, and 
also the existing tra·nsportation faeili ties in the 
territory p·ropos·ed to be served. If the C~ommis­
sion finds that the applicant is financially un:able 
to properly perform the s·ervice sought under the 
eertificate, or that the highway over which he) 
proposes to .operate is already sufficiently bur-
dened with traf£ic, ·or that the granting of the 
·certificate applied for will be detrimental to the 
!best interests of the Stat·e of Uta1h, the ~commis­
sion shall not grant such certificate." 
P:araphrasing thes·e guide ·posts by which the C'om-
miss~on '' sihall be guided'' (See opinion of Mr. Justice 
Wolfe in the Rowell.caJse, page 10 supra, as to construc-
tion of statutory working ''shall consider'' to be equi-
valent ·of "·shall be guided by") we see that the Legis-
lature has ordered the C·ommission (in addition to find-
ing .a public need and convenience) to find from 'evidence 
adduced at a public hearing: 
1. Whether or not the a:pplicant is financially able 
properly to perform the serviee sought under the- appli-
cati·on. 
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2. Whether or not the highways over which the 
appli.cant pr·oposes to operate will be adequate to accom-
modate additional traffic. 
3. What the existing traJllsportation fa1ci1ities, if 
any, in the territory pr·opos·ed to be served a.re, and what 
the effe,ct of the granting ·Of the application will be upon 
thos-e existing transportation facilities. 
· Upon the determina t[on of these facts the Legisla-
ture ha.s directed the Commission to deny applications if 
those facts rus so found .show that (a) Applicant is finan-
cially unable to properly perform the servi·ce sought 
under the Certificate, or (b) that the 'highway over which 
he pr~op·oses to operate is already sufficiently burdened 
Wlith traffic, or (c) that the granting of the Certi:fi.cate 
•applied ror will he detrimental to the best interests of 
the people of the Sta,te of Utah. In this latter conneetion 
the legislative man·date is that the Commission s'hall 
prevent unne,cessary dupliea.tion ·of servi,ce between 
common motor carriers. (.Section 5, C·hapter 6;5, Laws 
o:f U tab 1'93'5). 
Plaintiff submits that the Ciommission has violated 
the legislative mandate of its ·creator .and h'as failed to 
perform its statutory duties as hereinbefore prescribed. 
Unles~s checked by t:his ·court the result will be to repeal 
the pu!b1ic poli.cy 'of the State of Utah and substitute in 
lieu thereof a ·competitive situation between the Traction 
C'ompany and the .Airway Motor ·Coach Lines, Inc., with 
the prospe-ctive result which the legislative puhlic policy 
of this IS.ta.te was designed to p·revent. In other words, 
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as the ·Order no"T .stands tihe Tracti~on Company must 
con1pete. or be displaeed, despite the fact that "the very 
purpose of the Utilities Act is to prevent one public utility 
from destroying another." Gilmer vs. Public Utilities Com-
n?rissl~on, supra. Let us see in "That respeets the Commis-
sion has erred in order to reaeh this .st'ate of affairs. 
(2) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity despite evidence on which it itself has 
found that applicant has not the financial ability to 
properly perform the service proposed. 
With respect to th!is issue the evidence that appli-
cant has lost $8,240.00 ·of its capital of $9,400.00 in two 
and one-half years (R. 158, ·Tr. 145), that it has cash 
on hand of $13·6.48 (R. 6), that operations in P~ovo 
resulted in an -operating loss of approximately $4,000.00 
(R. 134, Tr. 21), and that the Draper operation was 
unpr·ofitable (R. 141, Tr. 28), fully supports the finding 
of the Commission that ''the finan·cial -conditi·on of this 
applicant at the present time does not s-eem to justify the 
expansion that would be n·eces1sary to undertake the pro-
pos·ed service" (R. 53). The C·ommission further found 
'':the assets ·of the applicant are only suffi,cient at present 
to sustain the ·operations ~conducted under the C·ertifi:cates 
heretofore iS'SUOO by t'he a~ommission for a peri-od of two 
more years at the r,ate at which these ass-ets have been 
diminished in the past .two years. * * * At the 
present time the current obligations of this Company 
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relating to the Utah operations are a pprorimately equal 
to ·existing assets.'' (R. 53, 54). 
The mandate of the Statute reqwired that t,he appli-
cation, ther·efore, be d:enied in accorftafYlCe with this find-
ing. Yet notwithstanding the statutory provision the 
·Commission granted the application and issued a certi-
ficate of eonvenienee and ne·cessity ef£ective immediately 
('R. 56, 57). · The effect of this, it is submitt·ed, wa1s a 
nullity in that the order was void. 
R·e.cognizing this statutory requirement, but seeking 
to avoid its mandate, the Commission attempted to justify 
its action by requiring .applicant (R. 57) to se,cure "not 
less than ·$15,000.00 cash in hand through the s.ale of 
capital stock in the Corp-orat~on, said sum to be used 
for the benefit of the Utah operations, to finance the 
purchase o[ needed equipment ·of a type to be approVied 
by this C·ommission, and to assure the financial stability 
of the D·orporation. * * * "·on or before June 1, 
1940. If the granting of t'he authority is c.onstrued to 
be conditional upon a further showing, the record dis-
closes no hearing and no sueh further showing. True on 
May 7 and after this point had been raised by the Petition 
for Rehe-aring, the applicant filed an affidavit (R. 103, 
104) to the effe·ct that this additional .capital had been 
rais·ed, hut ·Certainly this sel,f-serving affidavit filed ex 
parte 0an not he considered a substitute for a further 
hearing on notice. 
T·he evidence shows that the applicant has failed to 
meet the expense of its operations in P'rovo, Mill Creek 
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and in Draper, and the population 1n the vicinity of 
Crescent, Riverton, ''Test Jordan, B.ennion and Taylors-
ville ·can not pay the costs of .mass tra.nsp,ortation if th·e 
Mill·Creek, Draper and Provo territory can not. Sub-
stituting '''bus route'' for "road" the oprinion of the 
New York Suprem-e Court in the case ·of Peop·le v-s. Board 
of Railroad Co nun issiouers, 108 N. Y. S. 288, wherein 
the action of the Railroad Comn:iission in eertifying as 
to the neces'Sity and convenience for an additional rail-
way servi-ce was reversed, is applicable here. We qu·ote: 
'' * * * From the record it is extremely 
probable that the road cannot pay runnin·g 
expenses. It therefore would apparently he a 
financial cripp.le from the start, and there is no 
public necessity .for the construction of a road 
which cannot maintaan itself and which must 
inevitably be bankrupt fr.om the beginnin·g. ·Sueh 
a road in this territory cannot be a puhlie conven-
ience or necessity. 
"It is unne-cessary to go into detail as to the 
estimated business and the probabilities that t~he 
·Company may do such business, and the probable 
cost of operation and maintenance. The ·evidenee 
as to the p:vobable business and shipments is evi-
dently mere guesswork and greatly exaggerated. 
A mere statement of the locality of the proposed 
road and the manner in which that locality is now 
served by the ra.ilroads clearly indicates that 
there is no necessity f.or this road.'' 
Applicant has failed to meet its operating expenses 
despite .such economies as paying his bus drivers s:Ome-
where between $80.00 to $90.00 p·er month (R.. 163, Tr. 
50) in .contrast to a litt1e over $130.00 per month paid 
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employes o,f the Traction C·ompany (R.183, Tr. 70). On 
cross examination· by .Commissioner Ho~brook, Mr. D!avis 
indi·cated Ii.ttle knowledge with respe-ct to the operations 
of the C1ompany (R. 156, Tr. 43), and he admitt~d (R. 
1·60, Tr. 47) that applicant's •costs would be llc a mile 
nof {~Ounting depr'eiciation, with prospe.ctive revenu'es 
s~oon·ething less than lOc a mile. T~h.e feeling of the C~om­
mission with respect to the failure of applicant to meet 
its burden of pr,oof on this issue s-eemed· to be sum-
marized in C:oriunissioner H·olhrook'~s statement (R. 170, 
·Tr. 57): "Y.ou wouldn't really feel tha·t this C·ommission 
would be justified in granting the application based on 
the financial statement p·resented with the ·applieation, 
would y·ou ~ ' ' 
. Yet notwithstanding this testimony and the findings 
of the c:ommission, the Commission adopted the peculiar 
reas:0ning tha:t to provide an additional $15,000.00 which 
applicant could lose in its ~opera~tions, would be· the equi-
valent of the ·statutory mandate requiring applicant to 
meet the burden of proof of ~showing that its proposed 
operations are economically sound a.nd that it is :fi.nanciaJ-
ly able to perform the service sough.t. 
( 3) The Commission has issued a Celrtificate of Convenie·nce 
and Necessity without taking into consideration the 
,, 
existing trru,sportation facilities in the territory pro-
posed to be served by ap~plicant, and the offer of e~~ting 
. facilities ~:to furnish any additional' or suppleme·ntal 
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service determined by the Commission to be necessary 
and convenient, thus creating an unnecessary duplica-
tion of service. 
With respee.t t.o this gu·ide p-ost delineat~ed by the 
Legislature the Commission proreeeded t·o ignore uncon-
troverted e·vidence and the stipula ti~ons of the parties, 
n1aking no finding wha.ts~oever resp-onsive to the evidence 
~nd admissions, and making fin·din·gs unsupported by 
evidence as hereinbefore set forth. Turning to the Reeord 
for evidenc.e on this issue, w·e find: 
~T-he proposed service at first was designed sub-
stantially to duplicate the Utah :Li·ght and 'Traction Com-
pany service to Midvale and Sandy (R. 131, Tr. 18). 
Thereafter the cr·oss-·county s·ervic.e between Riverto-n, 
Draper, Midvale, Sandy, Murray, Taylorsville and Ben-
nion was developed (R. 136, Tr. 23), to be served by a 
shuttle bus as an adjunct to the main operations dupliea.t-
ing the Traction ··service (R. 130, Tr. 17), and to be 
diseontinued if unprofitatble (R-. 16·2, Tr. 49). D~avis at 
first d·enied but then admitted that these additi,ons and 
proposals were offered to obtain popular support ( R. 137, 
Tr. 24). Apparently appliicant was willing to make any 
promise with respect to rates, s-chedules, routes, service, 
territory to be ·served and bonds to be poS'ted (R. 168, 
Tr .. 5·5) or any other -conditi~on, just so ap·plicant could 
be permitted to start operating. Exact knowledge of 
either cost ·o.f operation or prosp-ective revenue soeemed 
no more important than the fwc:t that applicant had lost 
$8,000.00 in its operations during·the the past tw·o years. 
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The· P·resident of the C:ompany and its only witness with 
respect to these matters was not even sure what the 
extent of applicant's losses had been (R. 158, Tr. 45). 
Mr. Davis admitt~d ·on cross examination that the 
first eonta.cts with respect to the proposed service came 
from Murray (R. 13-2, Tr. 19)'(6) ; that C:ommissioner 
Hansen ·On behalf of Murray City offer~ed applicant a 
franchise as one inducement to make this application 
(R. 134, Tr. 21); that subsequently applicant contacted 
offi1cials ·of Midvale City with respect to an extension otf 
the servi0e to Midvale and Sandy, and proposed a fare 
of 20c (R. 13:5, Tr. 22). Having given this figure by over-
sight (or perhaps finding that this was the Traction Com-
pany fare and, therefore, no inducement for obtaining 
support from Midvale and Sandy) the prop·ose-d fare was 
lowered to 15c (R. 13'5, Tr. 22). (A twenty-five percent 
reducti~on in revenue ap·parently meant little or nothing, 
although such a redu-c:tion would generally he vital to 
other businesses.) 
Boiled down, we have a. C·ompany ·npera,ting on a 
small margin and at cut rates planning to invade terri-
tory served by protestants, and t:he problem presented 
itself of escaping fr,om the pr·ovisions of the Utah Sta:t-
utes providing for a syS'tem of regulated ·monopoly in 
(6)Mr. Me·lville: (R. 93, Tr. 80) "The whole thing is Murray's case, 
and ours is ~the same; it is identical." 
Mr. Behle: "Your case is Murray's ca•se?" 
Mr. M·elville: "Yes sir; we are interested in the same things. 
* * *" 
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this respe-ct. The applieant, f{)rced to admit that a du.p~ 
lication of serYiee \Yns pro·posed \Yhich would jeopardize 
the ability of plaintiff to furnish its existing serviee, took 
eYery •coneeiva.ble step to ereate popular support for its 
appl.icati{)n in the hope that the Commis·sion, as it did, 
would endeaYor to side-step the proYisions of la\v. The 
defendant adn1itted in its pleadings (R. 45) that th·e 
prup·osed serYi•ce \Yas a duplication but alleged it was 
justified because: 
1. Plaintiff's service south of 33rd South was inade-
quate and irregular. But as hereinbefore pointed out the 
the defendant failed in its attack on serviee; and the 
matter ·of inadequate and irregular service was not at 
issue in this ease involving convenien.ce avnd necessity. 
The only e:x;cuse for the existence ·of the defendant, Puhlic 
Service ·Commission, is to regulate and .supervise utilities. 
Section 5, Chapter 65, La\vs of Utah, 19'35, supra, not 
only Yests the C-ommission "\\-rith p·ower and authority, 
but makes it the duty ·Of the Commission to supervise and 
regulate common motor carriers, to £x, alter, regulate 
and determine just, fair, reasonable and suffi1cient rates, 
fares, charges and classifications; to regulate facilities, 
serviee, ·operating and time schedules in order to meet 
the needs of any ~eommunity; and to in.s'u.re adequa.te 
transportation service to the territory served. Defendant 
Commission has never hesitated to perform its duty and 
deal with complaints with resp-ect to service in the way 
contempl,ated by Statute, but the entire subject was 
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immaterial in a hearing on an application inv·olving the 
necessity and convenience for a new service. 
2. The public favored the Airway's application because 
this service was inadequate and irregular. But this· is im-
m·a.teri·al to the case at hand because .the puhli~c has its 
remedy with respect to complaints concerning inade-
quate and irregul,ar service. 
3. Plaintiff's fares were excessive and thus prohibited 
general public use of its service. This contenti·on is ~con­
sidered in our final point. 
4. Plaintiff's operations south of 33rd South were 
unprofitable. Plain tiff submits that it knows of no legal, 
moral or social sanct1on vesting in applicant, Airway 
Motor C·oach Lines, Inc., a duty self-imposed, to pertf.orm 
the services of guardian for the plaintiff, admitting 
solely for the sake ·of argument the truth of the con-
tention. 
5. Applicant was offering additional service to other 
communities without service, contingent upon the granting 
of the entire application. This was an admitted addition to 
a·ecomplish another and the ultimate end (R. 137, Tr. 24). 
But the new service did not lbecome necessary for this 
reason, 'because this additional .service if needed could be 
obtai,ned by the proper exercise of the duties of the Com-
mission as pointed out by c:ommissioner w eisley in his 
diss.ent (R. 109'). 
The conclusion Is ines·capable that the service 
authorized was _an unnec~ssa.ry duplication contrary to 
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law, and the order, therefore v;oid, unless justified by 
the matter of rates dealt w·ith herea.fter. 
The Ari~ona ~Supreme Court has recently taken 
occasion to point out t·o the Arizona Conllllission the 
proper procedure required by the statutes in a ca.se 
decided October 2, 19'39: Oorpora.tion Commission vs. 
Pacific Greyhownd Lines, 94 P. 2d 443. In this case the 
court reasserted the generally underst;ood rules with 
respect to such matters in the following language: 
"* * * The proper procedure to be fol-
lowed by the commis·sion, under the circumstances 
set forth in the record, was as follows : It should 
first have examined the new service offered hy 
the applicant and determined whether it is more 
in the interest of the traveling public than that 
furnished by the plain1iff. If its answer is in 
the affirmative, it should then offer to the plain-
tiff an opportunity .to furnish such new .servi·ce, 
and if plain tiff ~can, and will, do so, should deny 
the application. If it cannot, or will not, furnish it, 
and. the ne·w seryice offered 1ean reasonably be se-
parated into two parts, one being a service which 
can and will, be furnished hy the plaintiff, :and the 
other one which, for any reasion, is beyond its · 
power to furnish, and thi:s .separation will not 
injure the interests of the traveling public, the 
·commission should then issue· a certificate au-
·thorizing the applicant to carry on such portion 
of the service as it is beyond the p·ower of tme 
·plaintiff to furnish, but prohibiting it from giving 
such -serviee as .can, and will, be given by the 
plaintiff. :Lf, however, the new servi-ce offered 
cann.ot thu~ 'be reas-onably separated,· the commis-
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sion should then issue the certificate of conveni-
ence and ne·cessi ty for the new service to the 
applicant. This CJourse preserves as a paramount 
~consideration the benefit to the traveling public, 
while still protecting the interest of the existing 
·certifica·te holder so far as it can be without injury 
to that public." 
·This principle has been given express re-cognition by 
this Commission in the past ; In Re Blue and Gray Bus 
Line, P. U. R. 1924-A, 449. There the Public Utilities 
C·onunission of Utah said: 
'·"To further deplete the revenues of the 
street railway system by autbo.rizing a competi-
tive bus service, would only result in further 
restricting the company's ability to give service, 
and if competition were carried to its logical con-
·clusion, would utterly destroy the service so 
neeessa.ry to the many. It is the neces·sities of the 
general traveling public that must be considered, 
rather than the .eonvenience of the few.'' 
This principle is also to be f.ound in the decisions of 
every Commission and Court where regulated monopoly 
is the publi.c ;policy of the 1S:ta.te. For exam·ple, se·e Barton-
ville Bus Lines vs. Eagle Mo 1tor Coaah Lilne, 157 N. E. 
175 (Ill.); Egypti.arn Tra.nsp~ortation System vs. Louisville 
Railro1ad Comp·any, 152 N. E. 510 (Ill.); Cihicago R.aJil-
road Company vs. Com1nerce Commission, 167 N. E. 840 
(Ill.); Annota)tion 67 A. L. R., 957, and .cases P. U. R. 
Digest, ''Monopoly and Competition,'' Section 61, '' Op-
portunity for Present Carrier to Provide New Service,'' 
and ''-Automobiles,'' Key 83 of the American Digest 
System. 
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From the latter Chicago rase "~e quote briefly: 
HIt is contended that there \Yas no substantial 
eYidence sho\Ying that puiblic eonveniernce ,and 
nec.essity required the bus service. It is not th·e 
policy of the Public Utilities Act to promote com-
petition bet\Yeen common earriers as a means of 
proYiding servi·ee to the publiic. The policy esta;b-
lished by tha.t art is that throug~h regul~a tion of an 
established earrier oecupying a given field and 
protection of it from competition the public will 
he served more efficiently and at a more reason-
able rate than if other competing lines were 
authorized to render the same public service in 
the same territory. ~1ethods for the transporta-
tion of persons are established and operated by 
private capital as an investment, but as they are 
public utilities the state has the right to regulate 
them b~T such reg·ulations as are reasonable. The 
policy of the Public Utilities .Act is that existing 
utilities shall receive a fair mea;su.re of protec:tion 
against ruinous competition. Where one company 
can serve the public conveniently and efficiently, 
it has been found fvom experience that to au-
thorize a competing company to serve the same 
territory ultimately results in requiring the public 
to pay more for transp·ortation in order that both 
com·panies may receive a fair return on the money 
invested and the cost of oper·ation. The Com-
merce C-ommission has no arbitrary powers. Its 
orders must he reas·ona:ble and l~awful and the 
·que.stion whe.ther they are so or not is subject to 
review ·On appeal. To authorize the Commerce 
·Commission to grant the coa,ch eompany a certi-
ficate of convenience and necessity and authority 
.to operate its lines to serve the same public· 
already served hy ~the appellants, it was required 
that it be shown that appell~ants were not render-
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· ing adequate and convenient service .and that the 
operation· of the buS' lines would elminiate sucth 
inadequacy and inconvenien'Ce. In determining 
that ques1ti·on the primary ·consideration is the 
~convenience and necessity of the public. Whether 
the puhli,c 1c:onvenienee and neeessity require the 
establishment of a ne·w transportation facility is 
not determined by the number of individuals who 
may ask for it. The public must be concerned as 
distinguished from any number of individuals. 
Wes.t Suburban Transp. 'Co. v. Chicago & W. T. 
R. Co~, 309 Ill. 87, 140 N. E. 5·6; Choate v. Com-
merce Commi,ssion, 309 Ill. 248, 141. N. E·. 12.. T·o 
authorize an order of the Commerce c~ommission 
granting a certificate of convenience. and necessity 
to a carrier though another is in the field, it is 
necessary that it appear, first, that the existing 
utility is not rendering adequate service, 
· and it is .but ·a matter of fairnes-s and justice that 
it be :shown tha~t the new utility is ~n a p·osition to 
render better·· se-rvice to the public than the one 
alre·ady in the field. It is in a·ccord with justice 
and sound business e0onomy that the utility 
~already in the field . be given an opportunity to 
furnish the required . service where it offers and 
is ahle to do so. Egypti·a:h Transp·~ System v. 
Louisville.& N. R. C:o., 321 Ill. 580, 15·2 N. E. 510 . 
. Whe-re additional or extended service i~s required 
in the interest of the public and a utility in the 
field makes knowill its willingness and ability· to 
furnish the required service, the C·ommer:ce Com-
mission is not justified in granting a certificate of 
iCOnvenience and necessity to a. compe.ting utility 
until the utility in the field has had an opportun-
i·ty to demonstrate its ability to give the required 
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serYiCt'. B.artonville Bns L[ne v. Eagle Motor 
·Coa~h Line, 326 Ill. 200, 157 N. E. 175. '' 
!This "sugar-coating" of the Application did not, 
plaintiff submits, make the proposed duplication of 
serY1ce necessary. 
(4) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity based on the contrast between rates _and 
schedules of the various protestants, concerning which 
no adequate findings are made, and applicant's rates 
arid schedules. 
As indicated hereinbef.ore, .the defendant Airway 
M-otQr Coach Lines, Inc. attempted to meet the st~tutory 
mandate against a.n unnecessary duplication by claiming 
the admitted dupl~cation of service to be n-ecess·ary 
because plaintiff's fare.s were excesisive and thus pro-
hibited the general pu!bli;c use ·of its serviee ( R. 45). 
Analysis -of the Report of the Oomm1ssion indicates 
that the reasoning for granting the application seems to 
be based up-on three premises-
1. That there is some territory (no specific finding) 
south of Salt Lake City in ~~alt Lake C1ounty, _which does 
not now have comm-on carrier service, but w'hich might 
have if the application should be granted.· (No finding 
as to need for this service). (Re1port p. 4, R. 52). We 
have heretofore pointed_ out _th~ errors in tpis pre~ise. 
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2. ·That the granting of the ap:plication would not 
affect the existing servi.ce. (Report pp. 4-7, R. 52-55). 
vVe have likewise pointed out the errors in this premise. 
3. ·That the appli,c.ant offers lower rates in some 
instances. (Report p. 3, R. 51). This matter i~s now con-
side.red at this point. 
C·ounsel for applic;ant admitted that the only real 
basis for support of the a:ppli,ca.tion \vas the matter of 
fares. In urging the ~c·ommission to overrule plain tiff's 
objection to evidence vvith respect to rates on the ground 
that the hearing vYas as to convenience and necessity for 
the proposed service and not a rate hearing with respect 
to existing service, Mr. Melville stated (R. 44'8, Tr. 336): 
"if the Q.ommission \\Tants to rule out fares, we are out 
altogether. There is no use holding a hearing that I 
can see. The w.hole issue is improper fares ; that people 
can't ride-if the fares can't be gone into.'' 
Over plaintiff's objection this matter was considered 
iby the Commission and, as indieated above, appears to 
be the main factor in the pr·omulgation of the O·rder 
unaer review. we have heretofore P·Ointed out that in 
s-ome res!J)ects the findings of the Commis·sion on this 
evidence were incorre0t as to the :Contrasting fares, and 
in many respects were incomplete. 
The hearing upon t:he ap:pliea.tion of the defendant 
Air,Ya~~ Motor Coaeh Lines, Inc. \vas upon the question 
of the issuance of a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity pursuant to the provi.sio·ns of ·Section 6, Chap. 65, 
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La,Ys ·of Utah 1935; it wa.s not a rate hearing pursuant 
to Sootion 5, Chap. 65, La.,vs of Ut·ah 119·3•5. This the 
presiding· Conunissioner himself rec-ognized by his oral 
comment during· the hearing (R .. 120, Tr. 7). 
;So far as we kno'Y the cases are unanimous in the 
States """here the public policy w··ith respect to utilitie·s 
provides for reg·ula'ted m'on-opoly, to the effect that rate-
making has nothing to do with service ; that it is not in 
the public interest to permit established utilities to have 
their business destroyed by new companies attempting 
to engage in '' eut -t~hroat" competition inviting retalia-
tion 'Yith mutually disastrous results; and that com-
plaints with respeet to rates are to be corrected by 
regulation pursuant to statute through rate hearings, 
and not by destructive c:ompetition. ·To -correct excessive 
rates by proper proceedings is not ·only within the 
powers of the defendant 'Commission, but is its speeific 
duty under the law. (Sec. 5, c·hap. 66, Laws of Utah 
19·3'5). (See eases digested in the P·ublic Utility Report 
Digest under the heading ·Of ''.Monop·oly and Competi-
t~on' ', Sees. 40 and 48, and '' 1Cer~ti:ficates of Convenience 
and Necessity'', Sec. 89). 
As was stated by Commissio1ner Wiesley (R. 108), 
to bottom the issuance of a. certificate of convenience 
and necessity upon a ·eontrast of rates is to a.dmi't "either 
its unwillingness or its irrabili,ty to functi~on as required 
by the Act bri'nging it (the Commission) into exis,ten(~e. ,. 
* * * 'The de:par.ture seems particularly unfortuna·te 
in the instant case, because the utility already in the field 
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must ·continue to· meet its schedules, or, with our permis-
sion, abandon this porti~on of its service. If the rates 
pr,oposed by the appli,can.t 'are fair and proper, then the 
exi~sting serviee can and should he required to operate 
on them. But such rates might well be reasonable with 
only one operator in the field, and ye~t result in compet-
ing opera tors with parallel lines a'nd division of the tntal 
revenue, bo,th losing money. Here we have the essence 
of departure from regulated monopoly." 
:The claim that a proposal for lower rates by a new 
utility sh·ould he given 'Consideration in granting a certi-
ficate of convenience and necessity has been made here-
tofore without. avail, particularly in connection with 
eontra·sting rates of existing railway, and proposed motor 
bus, ·carriers. Typical are the decisions of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission under the· F'edera.I Motor Carrier 
Act of 193~5, 49· U. S. C'. A., Sec.tion 301, et seq. The 
questio'n was first raised in the case of In Re W ellspea:k, 
1 M. 'C. C. 71'2, de-cided April 2·2, 19·37, where the ·Commis-
sion said: 
"'The evidence shows, however, that the 
.traffi~c transported by applicants consisted large-
fy, if not entirely, of traffic there'tofore handled 
~by other carriers. The only convincing evidenee 
as to the reason f·or applicants' ability to ·ohtain 
this traffic is the fact that they published and 
ap.plied lower ra~tes. ·There is no basis for a :find-
ing tha.t rates .of carriers ·now in operation are 
too high and, even if that should be the case, that 
fact alone w.ould. not justify the issuance of certi-
ficates to additional carrier's in this territory. Any 
unlawful rates of existing carriers can be cor-
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rected by us upon complaint in accordance with 
tJ1e proYisions of the Act. The evidence does not 
warrant a. finding that the.re is public need· f.oi the 
p:voposed service but, on the contrary, indic.ate·s 
that the existing facilities of carriers who have 
conducted operations for a number of year~s are 
adequate to serve the needs of the shippers.'' 
In the matter of Harrison & H'a1rrison Com~m,on 
Carrie'r Application decided ·September 7, 19·37, 3 M. C. 
C. 7·6, the C:ommission cited the \Vell·speak case and said: 
''There is no basis for a finding that rates orf 
carriers now in operation are too high, nor would 
that fact alone be an element to be considered in 
determining whe~ther the p.resent or future puhiic 
convenience and necessity require the addition of 
another operator in that territory. Any unlawful 
motor-earrier rates ~can be correeted by the C!om-
mission upon complaint I'n accordance with the 
.provisions of the act.'' 
In that ease interested merchants testifying in sup·port 
of the Application stated that the service rendered by 
existing carriers was inadequate, inconvenient ~and unsat-
isfactory, that shipments we.re damaged in transit, 
deliveries made at inconvenient times, an·d that the 
tran-sportation charges were exorbitant. O~n the other 
hand witnesses ·called by protestants testified·. that the 
existing service was adequate and efficient and t~hat the 
available traffic was insufficient to support an additional 
operator. 
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Finally in the case of In Re J. N. Youngblood, 8 M. 
rC. ·C. 193 decided July 11, 1938, the C·ommission stated: 
''·To sum up, the .evidence adduced by appli-
cant, in an effort tn show that authorization of 
his proposed operarti.on is required by the present 
and future public convenience and necessity, 
shows no definite advantage of any nature which 
would accrue to the public by reason thereof, ex-
·cept the possibility of lower rates. The evidence 
.shows that the traffic 'Pr;oposed to be transported 
will consist entirely of traffic heretofore handled 
by other established ·carriers. The only convinc-
ing evidence as to applicant's ability to obtain 
this traffic is the fact that he proposes to charge 
'a lower rate than that now being charged by 
other earriers. There i·s no basis for finding that 
ra te·s now in operation are too high, and even if 
,that should be the case, that fact alone W·ould 
not justify the issuance of a .certificate to an addi-
tional carrier in this territory. If the rates of 
existing earriers are unlawful, they may be in-
vestigated by the Commission upon complaint, in 
accordance with the provisions .of the a~ct. The 
evidence will not support a finding that there is 
public need for applicant's proposed service, but 
on the contrary, it justifies a .finding that the 
existing facilities of -carriers which have con-
ducted operations f·or a number of years are 
adequate to serve the needs of the ship'Pers. '' 
We are not aware of any further cases decided ·on 
thi·s point by the Interstate Commerce Commission· for 
the reason, as state·d a.t the hearing by C!omm.issioner. 
Granger, (R. 16:6, Tr. 53) that evidence with respect to 
e:ontrasting rates is now eliminated entirely in hearings 
involving -c-onvenience and nece·ssity. 
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·The f.oregoing cases are also interesting in their 
suggestions as to the nature of the findings which a reg-
ulatory body should pr.operly make in a case involving 
eonvenience a:nd necessity, and V\rhich as \Ye have here-
tQifore pointed out, are totally lacking in the present 
Report ·of this Commis·sion. rr'he m·otor-carrier cases are 
replete ·with applications for certlificates .and we are 
unable to find a cas.e comparable to the one before the 
C·ommission where a. certificate ha~s been granted. The 
rule seems to be uniform that where the evidence shows 
the existing service to be adequate and tall that is justi-
fied by the pr·esent use thereof, where there is n·O' prospec:t 
of increase in demand sufficient to justify an additional 
operation, where the feasible necessity in the public 
interest and applicant's ability to carry out the proposed 
operations are doubtful, and the success o.f the proposed 
operation depends ,on the diversion of patrons from 
existing op·ertators, the application for a certificate should 
be denied.· This is the eviden·ce in the instant case. 
F,or example see In Re Slpeirs Application, 1 M. C. 
C. 555; In Re Ritz Arrow Lilnes, Inc., 1 M. C. C. 339'; 
In Re D.a/Vis Application, 1 M. C. C. 68; In Re Land Ap-
plication, 2 M. C. C. 759·; and the many other eases in the 
Motor-'Carrier Rep.orts collated in the Ha.wkins Index-
Digest-An,alysis of decisions under the Federal M:O'tor 
C'arrier Act, Ite-m 510. 
·This ruling is also .enunciated in the case of W es~t 
Suburbatn Transportation Company vs. Chicago cf; W. T. 
Railwa.y Comp·avny decided by the Illinois Supreme Court 
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in 1912:3, 140 N~ ~- '56. T·his cas·e is proba:bly· the leading 
case to what i·s the public policy under the, yarious reg-
ulatory acts regulating new competition and: the choice 
of applicants, and what factors s~hould be given weight 
and what should not in connecrtion with the issuance of 
a certificate of convenience and necessity. For. example, 
it is ·the key case in the Smith, Dowling and Hale '':.Case-
.B·ook on Public Utilities'' published in 1936. In view 
·of the importance of this ca·se we take the liberty of 
quoting extensively from the opinion therein written by 
Chief Justice Farmer of the Illinois Supren1e Court: 
''If the transportation f1acili ties furnished by 
appellee are so inadequate as to subject the public 
to inconven~ence, and the operation of appellant's 
bus lines would eliminate that inconvenience, the 
·order of the commission was auth.orized. It is 
not the policy of the PU!blic Utilities Aert (Smith-
Hurd Ann. St. e. 111-2/3, Sections 1,. 2, no,tes, 
:Section 3 et seq., and notes) to promote competi-
tion between common carriers as a. means of pro-
viding service to the public. The policy 
estahlish.ed by that Act is that, through regulation 
of an establi·shed .carrier oecupying a given field 
and protecting it fr.om competition it may be able 
to serve the public more efficiently and 1a.t a more 
.reasonable rate, than would he the oose if other 
competing lines were authorized to serve the 
public in the same territory. Method$ for the 
transportati,on ~of pertsons are estahUshed and 
operated by private capital as an investment, but 
.as they are public utili tie's the state· has.:.the right 
to reglllate them and their charges, so long as 
such regulation is reasonable. ···,The policy of the 
Puhlic Utilities Act is that existing utilities shall 
receive·· a ,fair . ·measure· of protec.tiorl. agains·t 
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ruinous eompetition. Rates of fare charg~d ,~or 
serYieP are· subject to regulation by the Commeree 
Qommission \Yithin reasonable limi·ts, :but the com-
mission has no po,ver to make a rule or order 
regulating a utility w'hich would amount to a. eon-
fisca.tion of its property or require opeTation 
under conditions '"·hieh W'"ould not provide a rea-
sonable return upon the investment. Where one 
company can serYe the public conveniently and 
efficiently, it has been found from eX'J}erience that 
to authorize a competing eompany to serve the 
same territory ul·tima tely results in requiring the 
public to pay more fior transportation; in order 
that both companies may reeeive a. fair return on 
the m·oney invested and the .cost of oper1ation ... 
'' The ·Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad 
runs south,ve-st from the Western Electric plant, 
thrtough Cicero, Berwyn, Riverside, Brookfield, 
La Grange, W-estern Springs, an·d Hinsdale, and 
performs a large part of the transportation of 
t·he pu!hlic in those tO'wn•s. It- has 15 stations be-
tween the _Western Ele;ctrie plant and Hinsdale, 
a distance of ahout 8 mile-s, and runs 19 to 34 
trains each way per day. ·This suburban service 
accommodates people desiring to go to points in 
the city of c·hieago, as well as peTsons desiring 
to ·stop a.t intervening stations between the West-
ern Electric pla.nt and Hinsdale. It does n·ot 
rappear that the public bas ever made any com-
plaint that the transportation service in the 
towns mentioned was inadequate or insufficient, 
and no proof wa.s offered on t·he hearing· to that 
·effect except the testimony of appellant's officers, 
and their testimony is not impressive. Only a 
comparatively small portion of the population of 
the West T.o~s would be more conveniently 
served._by the ·Operation -of the bus l~ne·s. 
'' The Commerce Commission h~s n,o arbitrary 
p1ow~rs. ..Its orde.rs must be reasona.ble and law-
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ful, and the question whether they are so or not 
is subject to review on a!ppeal. Public. Utilities 
C:o·m. v. Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad Co., 
267 Ill. 93, 107 N. E. 774; Chicago Bus Co. v. 
1Chicago Stage C:o., 2.87 Ill. 320, 122 N. E. 477. To 
authorize ~the c.ommerc.e Qiommission to grant 
appellant a certifieate of convenience and ne.ces-
sity, and authority to operate its lines to serve 
the same public already served by an existinlg 
utility, it was required that it be shown the exist-
ing utility was not rendering adequate and eon-
venien t service, and that the operation of the bus 
line would eliminate such inadequacy and incon-
venie-nce. In determining that ·question the 
primary consideration is the convenience and 
neces~sity ·of the pu!b1ic. Public Utilities Com. v. 
~Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Rail-
way Co., 288 Ill. 502, 123 N. E. 547. Wihether the 
pubHc .convenience and nece·ssity require the estah-
1lishment of a new transportation facility is not 
deter1nined by the number of individuals who may 
ask for it. The public must be concerned, as 
distinguished from any num:ber of individuals. 
Public Utilities Com .v. T·oledo, St. Louis & \Vest-
ern Railroad c·o., 286 Ill. 582, 12·2 N. E. 158. 
''
1Si0n1e individuals-perhaps a considerable 
number-would be convenienced by the operation 
of the bus lines; but it is clear f:flom the rec:ord 
.that to the great body of the public it would be 
neither a convenience nor ne.cessity. It "'-as not 
within the authority of the .commission to' author-
ize the operation of the hus lines f:or the conveni-
en:ce of a small part of the public already served 
by other utilities at no very great inconvenience. 
The order appealed from stated the bus company 
proposes to operate its transportation facilities 
at a lower rate of fare than the public is now 
paying, and in appellant's brief it says the f·are 
~charged is 5 cents; but the order does not fix 
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the rate of rare to be charged. Assunring- appel-
lant is limited to a 5-cent fare and appellee is 
eharging a larger rate, H1at ~Yas not, of itself, 
sufficient to authorize the order of the commis-
sion. The commission had authority to regul,ate 
the rate charged by the appellee, and if its fares 
W'ere excessive to reduce them. Fares are not 
the only thing to be considered in a case of this 
kind. The public is interested and vitally con-
cerned in adequate t.ransp!orta.tion facilities at 
reasonable rates, and the state is interested in 
a.ssis·ting to get them: but the state cannot, as we 
have said, require a. carrier to furnish service at 
a rate whi·c.h will not pay a fair return on the 
investinent and cost of operation. vV·e are not 
advised that any complaint had ever been 1nade 
to the commission that appellee is charging ex-
cessive· rates, and s:o far a.s this ·Case is eoncerned 
we vYill assume it is not ,doing so. The effect of 
aut·horizing the operation o.f the bus lines at a 
lower fare to serve the same territory would be 
to decrease appellee's revenues, and, if t~he rate 
it is no'\\' charging is a reasonable one, to require 
it to ·operate at a loss or increase its rates. This 
would be against the public interest, because ap-
pellant's lines eannot aeco1nmodate m~ore than a 
comparatively sn1all portion of the public in the 
matter of transportation. 
''The superior c.ourt f.ound and adjudged that 
the orderr of the commission was against the 
manifest ",.eight of t-he evidence heard, that. the 
operation of the bus lines is n:ot a convenienc.e to 
the public and a nec:essary transportation facility, 
that the present transportation facilities are not 
ina.dequa.te and do not subject the public to incon-
veniences 'vhich will be elimina~ed by authorizing 
the operation of the bus lines, and that the order 
and de·ci~ion of the commission are unreasonable. 
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· We are· of opini·oil the decision ·of the superior· · 
court was right, and its judgment is affirmed.'' 
Despite the absence of proper findings hereinbef,ore 
discussed, the applicability of the above opinion to the 
instant case insofar as the la.w and evidence are con-
cerned is readily apparent. 
A case appearing in the South Western Reporter 
a1dvance sheet of March 19, 1940, appears to us to like- . 
wise .deserve emphasis. Eldridge vs. Fort Worth Tran.-
sit Gomp,arny, 136 S. W. (2d) .9:55, deci~ed by the Texas 
·Court of Civil Appeals. It appears from this case that . 
the City of FoTt Worth, Texas, is a charter -city em-
po~ered 'to' grant franchises to utilit'ies, but. that such 
grants are· suhje~ct to the follo·wing restri·ction eom-
para:hle to that of the Utah S:tatutes applicable in the 
.A:irway ca.se: '' * * * ·such privi,lege over: and upon 
the ·same public streets,. alleys, highways, and thorough- · 
fares of the City shall not be granted to any person or 
corporation excepting when public necessity and con-
venience may require such use * * * '' The Fort 
Worth City Council held a hearing on notice with respect 
to the application of two ·tndiv,iduals for a franlchise for 
the: purpO.se of determining whetherr or· not the public~'' 
Clonvenience and necessity required the granting o.f a·;· 
p·rivrlege for the furni;shing of additional mass trans-
por.tation service within the City of Fort W·orth. Such 
hettr_ing was neither -called nor conducted as a rate cas-e 
and the evidence showed without dispute that the service 
ah:eady rendered in ih~ Qity was adequate, with full 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
69 
equipment, personnel and s~hedules, and , that the exist-
ing eo!npany '"·as ready, able and willing to furnish any 
additi~onal serviee which might be necessary or reason-
ably required: :further that the. .exi~ting. comp1any 's 
equipment was ample and sufficiently modern, safe, con-
venient and comfortable, and that if any further service 
should be authorized pursuant to the appli,ca:tion sam·e 
would be a duplication of the existing service. No evi-
dence was offered showing t·hat the fares charged by the 
existing ·company were excessive or unreasonable. T!he 
applicant proposed a five-cent fare, however, in contrast 
to ·higher existing fares. 
Mter the hearing the Ci,ty, as did the Commission 
in 'tp.e Airway case, found that there· was a public neces~ . 
sity and ·convenience for the proposed service, and th·e 
re9ord of the Council indica ted, as d!.oes. the Report in 
the .. instant caise, that the basis for this necessity and 
convenience was the lower proposed fare~ 
· · :The -co~rt held tha-t thi's finding ' 'was arbitrary and 
capri~ious an~ without reas·onable hasis of fact an~ was 
m~.de withq.ut proper n:otice or hearing with respect to 
such .: .rna tter. '' In enjoining further action under the 
a.pplication. the court said: 
''We hold that whet,her or not 'public.neces-
si,ty and convenience may require such use' of 
the Sttreets, a·s the ordinance her:e under . a ttaiCk' 
attempts to give, is a quespion o.f fact that must 
he established by competent and .satisfa;etory 
evidence, . in the light -of the. existing ·conditions. 
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'''
1If this conclusi1on of ours is not s·ound, then 
the City Cnuncil could arbitrarily an1d capricious-
ly pass such an ordinance a.s is under discussion 
anct wrongf:ully injure the vested pvoperty rights 
of any public s-ervice corporation, -operating in 
·the City of Fort Wior;th under a lawful franc:hise 
or privilege, by declaring that 'public necessity 
and convenience' requires such action.'' 
The court pointed out that the Charter ·of the City 
gave the governing body ample aut'hori~ty by proper 
proceedings ,to regulate rates, and t10 compel any public 
service utility to extend its service when there is a rea-
sonable demand therefor. 
At the he'aring the Comm,issinn itself did not seem 
wholeheartedly to adopt the view urged by applicant, 
f.or the Commission directed qu~stions t10 the witnes;s 
Davis indicating a foreboding that the appliea.tion was 
a prelude to .a. competitive servi1ce and to an auction-
·block procedure based upon rates. (R. 166, Tr. 53).<7) 
(7)"Q. But you figure if their rates .are to remain as they are and 
yours as you propose, you would operate in competition? 
''A. That is right. 
"Q. So you are not necessarily asking tJhat 1their authority be 
cancelled? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Do you believe that the rates should be the major element in 
determining convenience and necessity? 
"A. I think that the rate plays the major impor,tance; rates and 
.s-chedules. 
"Q. Rates and schedules? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And your more frequent schedule would become one of the 
elements? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Do you .know that the Interstate Commerce Commission absol-
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T·he view that the public policy of regulated mono-
JWly should be discarded in favor of competition, as will 
be the effect if the Ortder of the Commission in this case 
is sustained~ "\Vas also expressed publicly hy other wit-
nesses supporting· the application, e.·g., M:ayor Berger 
of Murray (R .. 202, Tr. 89). 
Other parties to the proceeding, however, sensed 
tha.t the injection of the rate factor would result in com-
petition, to the injury of the publi·c. 
·Thus E. B. Kelsey, appearing for the Street c·ar 
Men's Union expressed the view ,of th'a·t organization that 
the pr.oposed fares of applicant were in no small part 
possible at the expense of wages paid employes, and 
would not allow sufficient income to the company to 
utely refuses :to consider rates as any part of convenience and 
necessity? 
"A. I don't know that. 
"Q. Would you feel that if this Com·mission were to grant this 
application which you now make and .slx months fro.m now 
another applicant should come along and propose a 9 cent fare 
and a 14 cent fare, wtth a 15 minute service, that that applica· 
tion ·should be granted and yours cancelled? 
"A. We feel this w.ay about that, if anyone can come along at any 
time and offer the public something, with assurance that it can 
be fulfilled that ·we can't deliver to the public we feel that we 
are w.illing to step down at any time. 
"·Q. And you think tJhat'·s the ele·ment that this Commission 
should give weight to in reaching a decision? 
"A. I think rt:hey should; I would consider that public necessity and 
convenience. First, there are a lot of ,people in thi-s community, 
or .any other community, to whom rate structure ·means a lot. 
There are low-paid people in every com.munity that the differ-
ence between 5 and 10 cents over a period of a week means 
a little difference in something they mig·htt have to have to eat 
in the house over that period of time; and I really believe that 
a rate is very important, especially in an opera.tion that is 
conducted for the purpose of transporting people to and fro·m 
their work." 
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ma:int~in the. standa.r·d.of wa.ges ·set up hy his· organiza-
tien: (R: 3.73, T-r. 261). .Again, Mr. J~ R. Wilson, Presi-. 
dent ·of the S:a:lt ·Lake City F:ederation of Labor (R. 11·5, · 
Tr.:·:2), prote~sted the granting of the ·a.pplicati;on for the 
S1ame reason, and witness Joe B·arron of Midvale ap-
pearing on behalf of the Midvale Smelter M·en 's Union . 
331 ('C. I. 0.) stated that his local was neutral with 
respe·dt t·o the .bus lines; but that the standard of living 
should he kept up·, and t·hat if the effect of. the granting. 
of. the- a,pplication would result in t1he .replacement of· 
Trae;tion ·C:ompan.y employes making :a.pproxima,tely 
$130.00. per month by employes of the applicant making 
$80.00. to $901)() a month, . their organization opposed the 
g:nantin·g of the application; that their ·organization 
wou.l<l likewis·e opp·O'Se any effort of .the U ta.h· Light and 
·Tra~tion C·ompany to reduce costs of op·erating to ·com~ 
pete ":.·with the· applicant's ·proposed fares by reducing , 
w;a.ge ra.tes to a. scale comparable to appli'c:ant 's. While 
this witness prefe.rred to see he~tter service, and desired 
at tlhe .same time ~to !sustain the 'w~ge level, he s.tated that 
if~· ~h_o,i~e were .to b~ mad·e, he would.rathe;r,pay a higher 
fare or~ endure less- servi·ce by. way of s-chedules th~an 
to ~ee" the wages cut down (.R. 381, Tr. 26-9 ) . 
. "; Xs "s.tated ·in Mr. ·wiesley's · 'di~~·enting -.o·pinion, ''If' 
th~. r~action c:omp~ny ':rates ar~ t~o high the' c'ommission' 
1,, ' ;. • . ' . . 
is. dereU.ct in its duty. if it .fails to .. investig.ate, proceed 
, a .·,. . " .- -
tQ _;:4~·aring and .-order .· prop.er .and. neces~ary. modificJa~ . 
tions:". (R._:l08). . . 
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As stated by Mr. Woolley, the: Traction Company 
could stand a 35 percent reduction ofi l'abot ciOsts before 
the: ·Tratction Company W·Ould be pa.ying a. scale com-
parable to -that of applicant, and hy making this and 
similar reductions, might meet the fares offered hy 
applicant (R. 461, Tr. 349). But the Airway policy of 
low rates has n:ot paid ·even their· opera~ting eos.ts in the 
past,. and with the business divided, both compa;nJies 
would. continue to lose money, and in competition con-
tinue to cut costs until eventually curtailment in service 
or bankruptcy would affect the very public· now clamor-
ing for competition. T·here is just no es1ea.pe from the 
answer that the matter of rates under our system of 
regulated monopoly has no place· in a ·~hearing with 
respect to the granting of· a new certificate of conveni-
ence and necessi~ty, and that the Commission has made a 
grave, serio}ls and fundamental error in; this. respect. 
:Most members of the Bar afi,d students of Govern-
ment recognize the. merits of and ne-cessities- for the 
existence ·Of administrative agencies such as the defe.nd-
ant Public Servi·ce Commission in order . to deal efficie.n,tly 
and a pp~~priately with our moder~. ·COmplexities of 
society. To be "constantly guarded and ·checked, how-
ever,.. are the ·exer~pres·erit dangers of abuse of the 
admi~nistra.tive pr-ocess;;, and· the fuhc;tion of· the courts 
is to afford that check by. an appropriate judicial re~iew, 
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but not to s~tifle or impede the funetioning of the adminis-
trative tribunal. <8> The grave and fundamental errors 
which plaintiff' claims have been committed by the c:om-
:rh1ssion in this case arise, we submit, from the failure 
bf the majority .. ·of the Commission to understand the 
p·roeedure by which it is required and permitted to carry 
out the-"'1egislative mandate of its creator. Counsel for 
plaintiff ·consider the personnel of the present Commis-
~ion as ably equipped and conscientious as any public 
servants of this state. The importanlt issues of this 
case .are not with respect to the result reached, but the 
procedure of the majority of the Commission in reach-
ing that result. 
We sense that the maj·ority of the C-ommission acted 
pursuant to their hest belief and jud·gment, expressing 
their best views for the result rea·ched. Certainly 've 
c.an appreciate the motivating force ·of the public pressure 
put to bear; the public appeal of the applicant with its 
proffer of lower far,es and more frequent service to 
g~eater areas regardless of expense; .and the la~ck of 
substantial revenues over expenses availwble to the 
T·raetion Company -on this line, making abandonm·en.t of 
servi1ce perhaps the easy way out. 
i •. But the Legislature under our Constitution can not 
transfer its powers and prerogatives to the Commission 
acting in a legislative capacity, nor has it done so in 
this case. With, respect to a situation such as this the 
(8) See 193.8 Ross Prize Essay by Prof. Malcolm McDermott, A.B.J., 
Vol. XXV, No. 6, Jupe, 1.939, page 453. 
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Legislature has directed the Conunission as its agent 
to hold a public hearing on notiee, and to m'ake findings 
with respect to certain fact-situations has·ed upon sub-
stantial evidence to be adduced at the hearing, the burden 
of proof'being upon the applicant. In failing to observe 
this requirement of making finding~s responsive to the 
issues, and in stret•ching the :findings ma1de to go far 
beyond or eont.rary to the evidenJee adduced, the c·om-
mission has been led from its path of duty; for if it had 
made these findings carefully and properly, the result 
required by the Legislature dependent upon such facts 
would have been clear, not as a result of the exercise 
of the Commission's best judgment, but pursuant to the 
legislative mandate. And in reaching that result, the 
Commission could withstand and answer firmly any 
criticism, public or private, by the plain fact that it had 
performed the legislative coonmand and had dis.charged 
its duty. 
But in reaehing a result deemed the better of the 
alternatives presented to the Commission in this vig~or.:. 
ously-contested proceeding, \Ve submit that the majority 
of the CommiS"sion has departed fr·om fundamental 
principles, has a'cted in violation of the Statutes of the 
State of Utah, and albeit in good faith, has acted in an 
arbitrary and capTici~ous manner. 
Respectfully suhmit~ted, 
GEoRGE R. CoREY and 
C~VIN BEHLE, 
A ttorn.eyS' for Plain,tiff. 
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